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INTRODUCTION
In a recent survey of administrative law issues, Professor Bernard
Schwartz noted that "the entire subject [of administrative law] is going
through a period of well-nigh unprecedented change."' Professor
Schwartz further suggests that "[wie have been in the midst of a vir-
tual administrative law explosion."' This belief that the conceptual
moorings of contemporary administrative law are shifting is, I believe,
accurate. Until the new boundaries are demarcated, it is useful to focus
on fundamentals.
Ours is an era characterized by an intense and overt conflict between
* Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States. B.A., M.A., 1967,
J.D., 1973, University of Pennsylvania; B. Phil., 1970, Oriel College, Oxford
University.
I want to thank Neil Kritz, Hillel Weinberg, and Deborah Laufer for valuable assis-
tance during the preparation of this Article. I also want to express my appreciation to
William Olmstead, Gary Edles, and Jeffrey Lubbers for making the practice of admin-
istrative law an intellectual feast.
1. Schwartz, Recent Administrative Law Issues and Trends, 3 ADMaN. L.J. 543,
543 (1990).
2. Id.
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all three branches of government over their respective roles in the "ad-
ministrative state." Some claim that we live in an era of the "Imperial
President,"' noted by a "steady increase in presidential power over the
administrative process."' Others, in contrast, argue that we have
reached the age of the "Imperial Congress"5 which uses statutory
micromanagement to gain the upper hand.6 The judiciary too, has en-
tered the fray protecting its turf against "aggrandizement" by the
branches," and debating at length the degree to which it should defer to
the Executive in matters of statutory interpretation.8
In its early years, American administrative law was taught together
with constitutional law under the rubric of "public law."' It focused
primarily on such "big picture" questions as the appropriate structure
for democratic governance, implications of separation of powers, and
judicial review.10 With the institutionalization of the New Deal, how-
3. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
4. Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change,
and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1236
(1988).
5. In this view, "[t]oday's Congress is the champion of the entrenched special inter-
ests and the executive branch is the advocate for opportunity and innovation." Gray,
Special Interests, Regulation. and The Separation of Powers, in THE FETTERED PRESI-
DENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 211 (L. Crovitz & J.
Rabkin eds. 1989). See THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS (G. Jones & J. Marini eds. 1988)
(discussing development of "Imperial Congress").
6. See Fisher, Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and Mythology, in THE
FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 139-157 (L.
Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989) (addressing expansive role of Congress through
micromanagement).
7. See R.S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS" THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT (1983) (examining how federal courts have become increasingly aggressive in
their oversight of administrative action in area of clean air regulation and resulting
impact on environmental policy).
8. See infra notes 105-67 and accompanying text (addressing questions of
deference).
9. "Public law" is the general field of law concerned with the structure of govern-
ment and the relationship between citizens and their government. Thus, a standard
public law periodical in Great Britain, might include commentary on such subjects as
constitutional law, public administration, and administrative law issues. "Private law,"
in contrast, concerns itself with the resolution of disputes between private persons. See
generally Ptm. LAW (Stevens & Son, Co., London, England, United Kingdom, 1956-
1991) (providing example of public law periodical addressing citizen-government
relations).
10. For example, Ernst Freund, a pioneer in the field of administrative law, placed
great emphasis on issues of judicial review in his 1928 casebook. E. FREUND, CASES ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW V (2d ed. 1928). Freund divided his casebook into two sections:
"Administrative Power" and "Action and Relief Against Administrative Action." Felix
Frankfurter and J. Forrester Davison's influential casebook focused on constitutional
and judicial review issues. F. FRANKFURTER & J. DAVISON, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1932). The text of the Frankfurter and Davison
casebook is divided into three sections: "Separation of Powers;" "Delegation of Pow-
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ever, the emphasis of scholarly inquiry shifted from questions of legiti-
macy and accountability to the procedures governing agency adjudica-
tion and rulemaking. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) in 1946 reinforced this changed focus.1 The study of adminis-
trative law became, in large measure, the study of the civil procedure
of agency practice.'3
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in questions of democratic
theory and the allocation of power among the branches of government,
bringing administrative law scholarship closer to its moorings in politi-
cal theory and public law' s "back to the very foundations of our admin-
istrative law."" This renewed interest encompasses such topics as the
distribution of powers between the branches,"6 judicial deference to
agency interpretations,16 presidential oversight of rulemaking,'7 future
directions of the administrative judiciary," the challenge of due process
in administrative adjudications,' and the rise of alternative dispute res-
olution in federal agencies.20 These are all central issues for adminis-
trative law in the 1990's. There are other issues, particularly those sur-
rounding the rulemaking process, which this Article only tangentially
addresses. 2 ' Unlike the past, administrative law today deals with cen-
ers;" and "Judicial Control of Administrative Action."
11. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1988)).
12. Professor Schwartz believes this change toward the procedural aspects of the
administrative law field occurred following the four Morgan cases dealing with agency
decisional processes. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 60 (3d ed. 1988). The em-
phasis on the procedural safeguards found "legislative articulation" in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. Id. at 58-59. Professor Davis shares Professor
Schwartz' view. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.5, at 14-15 (2d ed.
1978).
13. Geoffrey Miller has attempted to provide empirical evidence for the claim that
structural issues have become significant litigation issues in recent years. Miller, From
Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 401, 402-07 (1989).
14. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 543-44.
15. Id. at 543.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 543-54 (giving examples of presidential oversight of rulemaking).
18. See id. at 554-56 (detailing future of administrative judiciary).
19. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 569-703 (addressing problems of due process in
administrative adjudications).
20. See infra notes 249-282 and accompanying text (discussing alternative dispute
resolution).
21. For example, non-rule rulemaking where agencies blur the distinction between
non-legislative rules such as manuals, guidelines, and policy statements which fall
within the APA's definition of rules. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988). See R. Anthony,
Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public (to be published)
(paper presented before ABA Regulatory Practice Section, Seattle, Washington, Feb.
9, 1991) (available at The Administrative Law Journal).
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tral issues in our political landscape. The enlarged curriculum can only
spark the interest of its practitioners and scholars.
I. QUESTIONS OF POWER AND AUTHORITY
A. Separating the Powers
In recent years, the Supreme Court has swung to and fro in its anal-
ysis of separation of powers questions. For a time, it seemed as if the
Court was accepting a "formalist" or "structuralist" approach relied
upon in cases such as Buckley,"2 Chadha," and Bowsher.31 However,
in cases such as Morrison" and Mistretta,'6 the Court appeared to be
advancing a competing "functionalist" approach. The Court's recent
decision in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, however,
which relied strongly on Chadha, indicated a return to the "formalist"
approach.
Under the "formalist" view,28 each branch of our government has
been assigned different powers, and it violates the "constitutional road
map" if one branch undertakes tasks assigned to any other. Thus,
under this model, separation of powers means that the executive branch
is exclusively responsible for executive activity, the legislative power is
limited to those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and
the judiciary retains the "judicial power."
There is substantial support in the case law for the "formalist" ap-
proach to separation of powers questions. In Myers v. United States,"2
the Supreme Court clearly articulated the right of the President to re-
move an "officer" of the United States, in that case a postmaster, with-
out the "advice and consent of the Senate." Removal, Chief Justice
Taft pointed out, is an exclusively executive function in that without it
the President would not be assured loyal subordinates and would be
unable to fulfill his constitutional duties.
3 0
Fifteen years ago, in Buckley v. Valeo,31 a unanimous Supreme
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
24. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
25. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
26. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
27. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June 17, 1991).
28. A useful articulation of the formalist position is Liberman, Morrison v. Olson:
A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 Am. U.L. REv. 313
(1989).
29. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
30. Id. at 119.
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Court struck down the then-existing structure of the Federal Election
Commission on grounds that it was inconsistent with separation of pow-
ers principles. Under the statute, presidential appointees were subject
to confirmation not only by the Senate but by the House of Representa-
tives as well.3 2 The Court held that such an approach contravened arti-
cle II's stipulation that federal officials be confirmed by the Senate
alone.35
This fidelity to constitutional text was followed in 1983 by the
Court's legislative veto decision in INS v. Chadha," and by its 1986
decision in Bowsher v. Synar,3s which involved a challenge to the origi-
nal version of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act. ss In
Bowsher, the Court held that the conferral of executive responsibilities,
however modest, on the Comptroller General, an officer of Congress,
contravened separation of powers principles.3 7 Specifically, the statute
charged the Comptroller with the power to produce detailed projections
of federal revenues and expenditures, and thus determine what budget
cuts would be required to meet the yearly deficit reduction target." As
in Chadha," Chief Justice Burger emphasized the Framers' belief that
"structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserv-
ing liberty.""0
Lurking in the background of this debate has been the related ques-
32. At the time, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, provided
that two of the members of the Federal Election Commission (Commission) were to be
appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the
House, and two by the President of the United States. All six members of the Commis-
sion were subject to confirmation by both Houses of Congress. Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, Title III, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 12-22 (1972), as amended
by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §
208, 88 Stat. 1463, 1458 (codified at 2 U.S.C. I 437c(a)(1) (1988)).
33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126-27.
34. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
35. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
36. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Title II, Pub. L.
No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, 1038 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (1988)).
37. Bowsher. 478 U.S. at 714.
38. The Court found this to be clearly an executive duty:
[A]s Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legisla-
tion, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its
enactment only indirectly by passing new legislation. By placing the responsibil-
ity for execution of [this Act] in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal
only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the
Act and has intruded into the executive function. The Constitution does not per-
mit such intrusion.
Id. at 733-34 (citation omitted).
39. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983).
40. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730.
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tion of the constitutionality of independent agencies."' For a time, it
appeared that the constitutionality of this "fourth branch of govern-
ment" was being placed in question, both by the courts " and the exec-
utive branch.," Former Attorney General Edwin Meese posed this issue
most directly in a well-publicized speech before the Federal Bar Asso-
ciation." Mr. Meese's position is based upon the unitary theory of the
executive branch which is expressed in Hamilton's discussion of execu-
tive power, particularly in The Federalist No. 70.'5
The theory is premised on the constitutional text that "[tihe execu-
41. Professor Schwartz notes that "for the first time in half a century, doubt was
cast upon the independent regulatory agency, even though its existence is half as old as
the Constitution itself." Schwartz, supra note 1, at 544.
42. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (declaring un-
constitutional provision in Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 which vested executive power in officer removable by legislature). This per
curiam opinion is generally believed to have been written by then-Judge Antonin
Scalia. Indeed, in the Bowsher oral argument, the Solicitor General stated that propo-
nents of constitutionality wished to "scare" the Court with the specter that upholding
the lower court would endanger the independent agencies. At this point, Justice
O'Connor confessed that "they scared me with it." 54 U.S.L.W. 3710 (1986). But see
SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1988) (upholding SEC civil
enforcement power); FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, 810 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting separation of powers challenge to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforce-
ment authority). See also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 625 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D.D.C.
1986) (dismissing constitutional challenge to authority of FTC to initiate and prosecute
certain complaints noted that "[t]he constitutionality of independent federal agencies
has never been fully adjudicated... the issue has been avoided for years").
One curious case recently placed a shadow over the independent status of these agen-
cies even while affirming their enforcement powers. In SEC v. Bilzerian, 750 F. Supp.
14 (D.D.C. 1990), the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a separation
of powers challenge to the vesting of civil enforcement authority in the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Noting that "Congress has no power or control over the
enforcement activities of the SEC," the court concluded that "it is clear that the SEC
is within the executive branch." Id. at 17. For a general discussion of challenges to the
constitutionality of independent agencies, see Survey, Constitutional Challenges to In-
dependent Agency Enforcement Action, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 423 (1988).
Finally, it is worth remembering that Chief Justice Burger's draft opinion in Bow-
sher was far stronger and specifically, so his colleagues believed, imperiled the indepen-
dence of administrative agencies. Schwartz, An Administrative Law "'Might Have
Been--Chief Justice Burger's Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 221, 233-
49 (1990).
43. See Brief for the United States at 27-51, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (No. 85-1377) (challenging constitutionality of Comptroller General under
Gramm-Rudman Deficit Control Act). According to Susan Bartlett Foote, "[t]he So-
licitor General's brief ... came as close as one can to a direct challenge to independent
agencies." Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Impor-
tance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223, 226.
44. Address by Edwin Meese, III, Federal Bar Association Annual Banquet (Sept.
13, 1985), reprinted in 32 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 406 (1985) [hereinafter Meese
Address].
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 430-31 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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tive Power shall be vested in a President, .. .. that is to say, vested in
the President alone. Further, the President must, himself,
undertake those enumerated powers explicitly granted by the Con-
stitution, 7 and in general "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed .... ,,,8 The argument suggests that this duty can be dis-
charged only if the federal agencies, which perform traditionally execu-
tive functions, are understood to be agents of the President and respon-
sible to him .4  Any other structure, the argument runs, would
undermine accountability--collapsing the notion that "the buck stops
here." Proponents of a unitary executive, view the federal bureaucracy
as a pyramid, with the President as the responsible official at the top.
The power to remove subordinates who do not follow the President's
directives, or in whom he no longer has confidence, is vital to his super-
visory ability. Limitations on the removal power, such as statutory re-
quirements that dismissal be for cause, are viewed as derogations from
executive power, at least when the government official at issue exercises
significant authority. 0
Opponents of "formalism" advocate an alternative model which al-
lows for permeability between the branches. This "functionalist" ap-
proach argues that Congress may, by statute, adjust or alter the tripar-
tite division of federal power so long as it does not undermine a core
function or responsibility of one of the branches.51 For the "functional-
46. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1 (capitalization in original).
47. For example, the powers to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy, request opinions in writing from the heads of the various departments, grant
pardons, make treaties, nominate ambassadors, Supreme Court justices, and other fed-
eral officers, and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §§
2-3.
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (capitalization in original).
49. Meese Address, supra note 44, at 408.
In other words, federal agencies performing executive functions are themselves
properly agents of the executive. They are not 'quasi' this, or 'independent' that.
In the tripartite scheme of government a body with enforcement powers is part
of the executive branch of government. Power granted by Congress should be
properly understood as power granted to the Executive.
Id. (emphasis in original).
50. Although espoused with particular rigor by the Reagan Administration, the
concept of a unitary executive is not particularly partisan. Former Attorney General
Griffin Bell, who served during the Carter Administration, joined former Attorneys
General Edward Levi and William French Smith on an amicus brief endorsing the
Department of Justice's position in Morrison. Brief of Edward H. Levi, Griffin B. Bell,
and William French Smith, amici curiae, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No.
87-1279). For a perspective on the continuing vitality of the theory, see Cross, The
Surviving Significance of the Unitary Executive, 27 Hous. L. REV. 599 (1990).
5I. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935) (recognizing need for quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, which have
1991]
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ist," two questions predominate: first, does the act in question prevent a
branch from performing a "core" function; and second, will such action
"alter the balance of authority" between the branches?82 Thus, for ex-
ample, in United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court adopted a "func-
tionalist" approach when it examined on the one hand the nature of the
disputed activity-the general privilege of confidentiality of Presiden-
tial communications-and the administration of the criminal justice
system on the other, and held that allowing the assertion of executive
privilege "to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a crim-
inal trial would ... gravely impair the basic function of the courts." 5
Although not styled as such, the first articulation of the "functional-
ist" approach was in Humphrey's Executor v. United States," which
limited the expansive reach of Myers by holding that the Framers in-
tended to limit the removal power to "purely executive officers."50 In
contrast to Myers, the Humphrey's Executor Court dealt with a
strange beast: a Federal Trade Commissioner, which it viewed, as it did
all independent agency commissioners, to be in certain respects "quasi-
legislative" and in others "quasi-judicial," but in any event, "wholly
officers independent of executive control). See generally J. LANDis, THE ADmiNISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS 15 (1938)(explaining administrative process needs to be more than "sim-
ply an extension of executive power" in order for agency to carry out its duties);
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578, 616-21 (1984) (advocating use of "checks and
balances approach" language rather than "functional approach" language); Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987) (arguing that while formalism has its
advantages, United States Government can clearly be described as functional); Bruff,
Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 498 (1979)
(stating "presidential supervision of officers should vary with the function involved");
Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 533,
537 (1989) (explaining that, "functional analysis favors complex arrangements blend-
ing the powers of the branches; formalism tends to condemn them"). See also Krent,
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Au-
thority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U.L. REv. 62, 64 (1990) (examining
"constitutional delegations outside the federal government").
52. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). In the
Morrison iteration of this standard, the action cannot "involve an attempt by Congress
to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch." Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988).
53. United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).
54. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
55. Id. at 629-32. Note that Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984), suggests that
Humphrey's Executor proposes a "radical" approach to separation of powers, empha-
sizing the need to place agencies in one or another branch, maximally free from intru-
sion by the others." Id. at 611. He muses that the Court's formalism here might have
been the result "of growing executive totalitarianism in Europe-in which resistance to
broad executive authority was only to be expected." Id. at 612 n.154.
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disconnected from the executive."" Consequently, the Court held that
Congress could set limits on the President's removal power vis-A-vis
these officials.
Recent court opinions have followed this "functionalist" approach,
and in so doing, have seriously challenged the theory of the unitary
executive. In Morrison v. Olson, 7 the Court sustained the constitution-
ality of a statute providing for the appointment of an independent
counsel to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by certain executive
officials, notwithstanding the fact that the counsel was independent of
the Department of Justice supervision and that the Attorney General's
removal power was limited by statute to a "good cause" standard." In
Morrison, the Court ruled that the congressional restrictions on the ex-
ecutive power were not "of such a nature that they impede[d] the Pres-
ident's ability to perform his constitutional duty."' Placing itself firmly
in a "functionalist" posture, the Court held that the "analysis con-
tained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories..
. but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President's
exercise of the 'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed duty
to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article 11.""
The Morrison decision raises significant questions about the removal
power which is, of course, the President's trump card when it comes to
ensuring the faithful execution of the laws." Under a "formalist" anal-
ysis, the President has unfettered power to dismiss "officers of the
United States"62 -as long as they are in the executive branch. This
authority does not reach officials in the judicial or legislative branches,
nor under Humphrey's Executor, independent agencies.
In adopting this balancing procedure, the Morrison Court stepped
back from the notions of "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" uti-
lized in Humphrey's Executor. Acknowledging that "[w ] e undoubtedly
did rely on the terms 'quasi-legislative' and 'quasi-judicial,'" the Mor-
rison Court recognized the "difficulty of defining such categories," 8
stating that "our present considered view is that the determination of
whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a 'good cause'-type
56. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628-30.
57. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
58. Id. at 696.
59. Id. at 691. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court held that the statute in question
did not "impermissibly interfere with the President's authority under Article II." Id. at
660 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 689-90.
61. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3 (capitalization in original).
62. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
63. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988).
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restriction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be
made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as 'purely exec-
utive.' "" The Court further noted that, "[w]e cannot say that the im-
position of a 'good cause' standard for removal by itself unduly tram-
mels on executive authority."'
If followed, this holding may strike a long-term blow to traditional
notions of Presidential power. Myers affirmed that executive accounta-
bility requires untrammelled executive removal authority. Humphrey's
Executor carved out an exception to this principle for independent
agency commissioners. If Morrison means what it says with respect to
removal of an executive branch official, it may emasculate the Myers
principle entirely."1
The practical question, however, is what is meant by "good cause?"
If the "good cause" standard is the one for impeachment which re-
quires evidence of high crimes and misdemeanors, then the restriction
clearly makes a difference. Even if it means some esoteric act, that too
is a serious limitation of Presidential authority. However, some consti-
tutional scholars claim that "good cause" may include a failure to fol-
low a Presidential directive in an area of rulemaking that requires a
unified policy approach under the President's direction." Adoption of
this broader construction of "good cause" would protect Presidential
prerogatives and probably reduce the political, if not the theoretical,
underpinnings of further controversy over the reach of the "removal
power."
Following Morrison, the Court in Mistretta v. United States," up-
held the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission
and its sentencing guidelines, rejecting the argument that the Commis-
sion was a judicial body impermissibly exercising executive authority.6 '
64. Id.
65. Id. at 691.
66. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 548. In this regard, I agree completely with Profes-
sor Schwartz' suggestion that "Morrison's ultimate effect may be a weakening of the
President's position as administrative chief of the government." Id.
67. See Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 44-45 (advocating
that President can remove policy-making officials in agencies and Congress cannot
usurp this power under Constitution). According to Miller, Congress may not restrict
the President's power to remove officers who have failed to follow a presidential direc-
tive to take action within their statutory discretion. Id. at 97.
68. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
69. Id. at 412. The Court concluded that:
[I]n creating the Sentencing Commission-an unusual hybrid in structure and
authority-Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the
constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches.
The Constitution's structural protections do not prohibit Congress from delegat-
ing to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of
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Speaking for eight members of the Court, Justice Blackmun main-
tained that separation of powers does not require "a hermetic division
between the Branches,""0 but means only that each branch must be
free of the control or coercive influence of the others.
Admitting that the Sentencing Commission was a "peculiar institu-
tion within the framework of our Government,"'" Justice Blackmun
recognized that separation of powers principles are not violated by
"mere anomaly or innovation."'" The Constitution is violated only if
Congress places in one branch the powers that the Constitution vests in
another branch, or otherwise undermines the independence of one of
the three branches.
The Court's 1986 decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion v. Schor,73 announced the same day as Bowsher, is further illustra-
tive of the "functionalist" approach. The Court held that the Commod-
ity Future Trading Commission's adjudication of certain state law
claims, incident to its resolution of claims under the federal commodi-
ties statute, was not an unconstitutional infringement on the article III
judicial power. 74 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor declined
formulating sentencing guidelines .... Nor does our system of checked and bal-
anced authority prohibit Congress from calling upon the accumulated wisdom
and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely
within the ken of judges.
Id.
This approach was foreshadowed in Morrison, which suggested that "[i]t is not diffi-
cult to imagine situations in which Congress might desire that an official performing
'quasi-judicial' functions, for example, would be free of executive or political control."
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 n.30.
70. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381. Specifically, the Court tracked James Madison,
noting that so long as those who completely control one branch do not completely con-
trol another, the "fundamental principles of a free Constitution are [not] subverted."
Id. (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 47, at 325-26 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)). In
support of this position, the Mistretta Court cited Justice Jackson for the proposition
that "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also con-
templates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciproc-
ity." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion)).
71. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384. Although the Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988), places the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch, the
Sentencing Commission is neither a court nor does it exercise judicial power. Rather,
Congress delegated the responsibility for formulating sentencing guidelines to the Sen-
tencing Commission, comprised of seven voting members, three of whom must be fed-
eral judges. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
72. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385. The Court noted that although the Sentencing
Commission was a peculiar institution, "petitioner's fears for the fundamental struc-
tural protections of the Constitution prove ... to be 'more smoke than fire.'" Id. at
384.
73. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
74. Id. at 856-57.
1991]
358 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL
to adopt "formalistic and unbending rules."' 70 Instead, she outlined a
number of factors the courts should balance in determining the effect
that congressional allocation of part of the adjudicative function to ad-
ministrative agencies will have on the constitutionally assigned role of
the federal judiciary. These factors include
the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to
Article III courts ... the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the
origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.
Criticizing this tilt toward the "functionalist" model, Justice Scalia,
in his Mistretta dissent, prophesied, "all manner of 'expert' bodies, in-
sulated from the political process, to which Congress will delegate vari-
ous portions of its lawmaking responsibility." 77 This was not idle fan-
tasy. The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, vetoed by the
President, would have created a Special Counsel subject neither to ex-
ecutive branch supervision, nor removable at will.78 Last year, legisla-
75. Id. at 851 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 587
(1985)).
76. Id.
77. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
One of the most intriguing perspectives on Morrison and Mistretta has been Martin
Redish's point that in both cases, "the Court indicated a troubling willingness to ra-
tionalize and justify unambiguous breaches of the concept of judicial separation of
powers that in themselves are far from de minimis." Redish, Separation of Powers.
Judicial Authority and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and
Mistretta, 39 DE PAUL L. REV. 299, 303 (1990). Redish suggests that the real separa-
tion of powers issue was not judicial aggrandizement, such as the judicial branch im-
properly interfering with the executive branch, but rather was "that the judicial branch
had been legislatively directed to perform a nonjudicial function." Id. at 310. In Morri-
son, the "nonjudicial function" was the vesting of authority in a specially created arti-
cle III court to terminate the independent counsel's tenure. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2)
(1988) (indicating independent counsel functions judicially, but removal of counsel is
"administrative" action on part of statutorily created Special Division). Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1988) (stating "[ilt also is not a power that could be
considered typically 'judicial,' as it has few analogues among the Court's more tradi-
tional powers"). Similarly, in Mistretta, the Sentencing Commission "promulgates
binding, generalized guidelines, divorced from the setting of a specific case, much as a
legislature would." Redish, supra, at 313. But see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 397 (stating
"[tihe text of the Constitution contains no prohibition against the service of active
federal judges on independent commissions such as that established by the Act"). By
straying outside of its adjudicative "case or controversy" function, the Mistretta Court
arguably poached on the legislative function and contributed to the politicization of the
judiciary. Aggrandizement of a branch is no less proper when Congress orchestrates it
on behalf of the judiciary than it is in the case of traditional legislative-executive
encroachments.
78. President Reagan vetoed the legislation, in part because "[t]he litigation of in-
tra-Executive branch disputes conflicts with the constitutional grant of the Executive
Power to the President, which includes the authority to supervise and resolve disputes
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tion providing for Cabinet-level status for the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) was blocked by a dispute over congressional interposi-
tion of the Bureau of Environmental Statistics, which was not account-
able to other officials in the executive branch.
7'
Accountability questions have arisen also regarding aspects of the
work of the Inspectors Generals" and with the False Claims Act
Amendments of 1986.1 Indeed, Congress has proposed establishing a
between his subordinates." Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1377, 1378 (Oct. 26, 1988); S.
508, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S1914 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987). A subse-
quent version of the bill deleted provisions empowering the Special Counsel to oppose
any executive branch agency in court.
When President Bush signed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and at 22 U.S.C.
§ 4139), he underscored that statutory provisions for concurrent transmittal of infor-
mation by the Special Counsel to the Congress and the Executive would not be inter-
preted by the White House as limiting the President's "ability to provide for appropri-
ate prior review of transmittals" to Congress. Statement on Signing the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PuEs. Doc. 516 (Apr. 10, 1989).
79. The Bureau of Environmental Statistic's (Bureau) Director could not be fired
by the President, and the Bureau's reports could not be reviewed prior to release, as are
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA), by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Department of Environmental Protection Act, H.R. 3847, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) (dealing with Bureau of Environmental Statistics at H1172). See also
Weisskopf, Drive to Elevate EPA to Cabinet Is Stalled, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 1990, at
A19 (discussing problems with making EPA department in Cabinet).
80. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-12 (1988)). The Act provides for an In-
spector General (IG) with the authority to supervise the programs of administrative
agencies so as to insure "economy and efficiency in the administration of, [as well as
to] prevent[] or detect[] fraud and abuse in, its programs and operations." Id. §
4(a)(3), 92 Stat. 1102. The Act also authorizes the removal of IGs only when the
Executive communicates its reasons for such removal to Congress. Id. § 3(b), 92 Stat.
1101-02. While the Act does not require removal only "for cause," the Justice Depart-
ment nevertheless objected to the removal provision on grounds that it unduly inter-
feres with the executive branch's "unfettered discretion" to remove an executive offi-
cial. S. Rep. No. 1071, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2676, 2700. For a general discussion of the Justice Department's
objections to the removal clause of the Inspector General Act, see DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY H.R. 2819,
reprinted in Establishment of Offices of Inspector General: Hearings on H.R. 2819
Before the Subcomm. of the Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 831-49 (1977).
81. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-
3733 (1988)). The Amendments substantially broadened the opportunities for private
individuals, acting on behalf of, and in the name of, the United States Government, to
sue those submitting false claims for payment of government funds. If successful, these
private attorneys generally are entitled to up to 25% of the government's awarded
damages. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722
F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding qui tam actions do not violate separation of
powers even though prosecutorial functions are delegated to private parties); United
States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (finding qui tam provisions of False Claims Act do not violate separation of
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special environmental counsel who could bring environmental cases to
court independent of the Department of Justice.82 And for one fleeting
moment during Watergate, Senator Ervin and others proposed making
the Department of Justice itself, "an independent establishment." 83
No doubt reflecting a concern with the rise of such "expert bodies
insulated from the political process,"" three Justices recently placed a
gloss on the "functionalist" approach in an effort to move the Morrison
analysis closer to the Court's "structuralist" framework. Public Citizen
v. Department of Justice5 concerned the applicability of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act to the American Bar Association Committee
which advises the President on judicial appointments. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the "functionalist" balancing test
does not apply when the Constitution explicitly assigns an activity to
the exclusive control of the President." He suggested that courts can
use "functionalist" balancing only in those situations where the Presi-
dent, as the Nation's Chief Executive, is exercising his general grant of
executive power under article 11.87 Under this view, the ability to apply
the "functionalist" approach would be significantly limited.
Morrison notwithstanding, the period of executive self-abnegation
vis-a-vis the independent regulatory agencies may be passing, if not
past. Until recently, the consensus was that Humphrey's Executor"
precludes any Presidential involvement in the work of the independent
regulatory agencies. One need only recall the tempest that erupted in
powers or appointment clause). See generally Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui
Tam Actions, 99 Yale L.J. 341 (1989) (stating qui tam actions by private Attorneys
General are unconstitutional); Vogel, Citizens' Lawsuits Based on the False Claims
Act Have Multiplied, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 20, 32-34, col. I (defending qui
tam actions and restrictions upon them).
82. Federal Nuclear Facilities Environmental Restoration and Management Act, S.
2189, H.R. 4193, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988). The special environmental counsel
would "not be responsible to, or subject to the supervision or direction of, any officer,
employee, or agent of the United States." S. 2189, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Title 4, §
401(A) (1987). He would have subpoena power, could issue orders or bring civil suit
against the head of any department or agency, or against any federal contractor, for
violation of any federal environmental laws, and could impose civil money penalties for
lack of compliance of up to $25,000 a day. This is the beginning of the attempt to
make the entire Department of Justice "an independent establishment." Removing
Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803, S. 2978 and S. 2615
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 298 (1974) [hereinafter Hearings].
83. Hearings, supra note 82.
84. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 482-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 482-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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the early days of the Reagan Administration when Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) Chairman Mark Fowler briefed the Presi-
dent on proposed FCC regulations governing syndication rights for net-
work programs.89 Lately, however, the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Treasury jointly participated in the Work-
ing Group on Financial Markets" without any suggestion of constitu-
tional impropriety. This is to the good. The Executive and independent
agencies should be able to communicate freely without fear of rankling
the guardians of congressional turf. Further, present law does not pro-
hibit-and the Constitution's "take care" clause may actually re-
quire-policy coordination between independent agencies and the
executive.
In December 1988, the Administrative Conference of the United
States (Administrative Conference) approved a recommendation con-
cerning presidential review of agency rulemaking. It endorsed, as a
matter of principle, presidential review of independent agency rulemak-
ing to the same extent that such review applies to executive branch
agencies."1 The American Bar Association has done so as well.9
2
Though it has been concluded that "Mistretta and Morrison re-
present a welcome post-Burger return to a more flexible interpretation
of the constitutional doctrine,"" I am unable to agree that matters are
quite so settled, or that Morrison provides "the complete legal an-
swer."" Although the "formalist" approach risks upsetting many ad-
ministrative law applecarts, the "functionalist" view leaves unresolved
89. Burnham, Reagan Hit on F.C.C. Briefing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1983, at C28,
col. 1.
90. Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9,421 (1988).
91. PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING, ACUS RECOMMENDATION
88-9; 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-89 (1991). The recommendation, urged a disclosure mecha-
nism for intergovernmental communications similar to those in S. 1742, pending in the
Senate at the close of the 101st Congress. S. 1742, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
92. The American Bar Association (ABA) recommendation, adopted in February
1986, is appended to Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, app. at 206 (1986). Explicitly adopting
the theory of the unitary executive, the recommendation notes that the "constitutional
principles that justify presidential involvement in rulemaking activities are applicable
to both the executive and the independent agencies. [Executive oversight of rulemak-
ing] should be extended to the independent agencies because of the need for presiden-
tial oversight of all administrative rulemaking activities." Id. See also ABA COMMIS-
SION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 83
(1979) (discussing recommendations for rulemaking reform).
93. Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases during 1989, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 423,
424 (1990). In that article, Professor Schwartz clearly defines himself as a
"functionalist."
94. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 548 (noting changes in interpretation of separa-
tion of powers).
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serious challenges to traditional notions of executive power. After sup-
ping, albeit gingerly, at the "functionalist" table, the Court seems, in
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority," to have settled back
into a "formalist" stance.
In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, the Court struck
down an arrangement in which Congress' transfer of National and Dul-
les airports to an Airport Authority created under Virginia and District
of Columbia law was conditioned on the appointment, by the Author-
ity's directors, of nine members of Congress" to a Board of Review
with specified veto powers. These Members of Congress were to be ap-
pointed in their individual capacities to serve as representatives of air-
port users.97
The Court asserted that "for separation of powers purposes" the Re-
view Board was a congressional agent exercising federal authority. The
Court of Appeals had invalidated the Board on the basis that by dele-
gating to it veto power, the Board exercised "quintessentially execu-
tive" powers." However, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
categorize the type of authority: if the federal authority exercised was
legislative, the Constitution does not allow boards or other entities to
substitute for Congress;" and if the "power is executive, the Constitu-
tion does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it."100
Apparently fearing the overweening exercise of congressional author-
ity, Justice Stevens underscored that the "statutory scheme challenged
today provides a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative
power beyond its constitutionally confined role."' 0 1 His fear was that
the process of conditioning grants to states used in Metropolitan Wash-
ington Airports Authority could enable Congress "to retain control,
outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant
recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of national pol-
95. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June 17, 1991).
96. The Members were drawn from committees having jurisdiction over transporta-
tion issues. Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100
Stat. 3341-378 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 2456(0(1) (1988)).
97. Id.
98. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metropolitan Wash. Air-
ports Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1990), reversed, 59 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June
17, 1991).
99. 59 U.S.L.W. at 4666 (stating that "[i]f the power is legislative, Congress must






icy."102 No matter how delicately balanced and "innovative" such insti-
tutions might be,' 03 this kind of legislative ingenuity "permit[s] Con-
gress to evade the 'carefully crafted' constraints of the Constitution." 1"
By laying down markers to guide congressional drafters, the Court goes
a long way in reasserting the traditional distinctions between the
branches. And so the wheel turns.
B. Questions of Deference
One of the most complex problems for students of administrative law
is the impact of statutory interpretation on the power relationships be-
tween the branches. The battle is, in part, between the courts as "trus-
tee for the ghosts of Congresses past,"'05 in then-Chief Judge Wald's
fabulous phrase, and administrative agencies, whose actions presuma-
bly reflect the views of administrations present. A sitting administra-
tion will obviously seek to interpret an agency's mission by its own
lights. Those who do not like what those lights reveal, appeal to what
Congress "really" meant when it passed a statute-even though what
Congress often did was to vest authority in the agency without deciding
precisely how it wanted the agency to implement that authority.
There were, in the past fifteen years, increasing signs of deference by
the judiciary to executive decisionmaking. In Vermont Yankee,'" the
Supreme Court specifically instructed lower courts to stop, on their own
volition, adding due process "bells and whistles" to the APA's informal
rulemaking procedures. 10 Later, in Heckler v. Chaney, °'" the Court
held that the judiciary may not interfere when an agency has decided
not to act, thus reducing the zone of judicial interference in agency
decision-making.'" °
102. Id.
103. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4666 (White, .. ,
dissenting).
104. Id. at 4664 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)).
105. Wald, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 507, 522 (1988).
106. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
107. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). Even State Farm can
be read to suggest that if an agency gives reasons for its position and they comply with
the statute, there will be no second guessing and the agency will be left alone. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (holding
agency's rescission of air bag requirement as arbitrary and capricious when agency
failed to provide adequate reason for rescission).
108. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
109. Id. at 831. Note, however, that the agency's decision not to act is only pre-
sumptively unreviewable. "[T]he presumption may be rebutted where the substantive
statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement
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Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council'" is the
most important example of this new judicial deference to agency deci-
sionmaking. Indeed, Chevron has become a judicial icon. More than
one thousand cases have cited this opinion."' But, it would be wrong to
conclude from the frequency of its citation that the case is uniformly
followed. In fact, in the past few years it has been inconsistently ap-
plied, even by the Supreme Court. At times, the only certainty is the
difficulty of discerning a pattern in the granting, or not granting, of
Chevron deference by the courts.
Under Chevron, when a court reviews an administrative agency's in-
terpretation of a statute, it must look initially to the statute to deter-
mine if Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at issue.
"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." '' However-and this is the famous
"Chevron Step 2"-"[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."' 13
Such, regulatory flexibility is the raison d'itre of the administrative
process. An agency typically is charged with promulgating regulations
that implement open-ended statutes. Congress, one might say, paints
with a broad stroke and then asks the agency to fill in the gaps. If that
is true, then an agency must interpret its statutory charge in light of
the sitting administration's policy preferences. Only when an agency
opts for a reading of its congressional mandate that is not "permissi-
ble" should the court rein it in. If, on the other hand, executive discre-
tion is exercised through a permissible interpretation of an agency's
powers." Id. at 832-33.
110. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
111. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,
2074-75 (1990).
112. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. In Continental Training Servs., Inc. v. Cavazos,
893 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1990), despite clear statutory language requiring a hearing on
the record prior to "the limitation, suspension, or termination of the eligibility for any
program," id. at 881, funded under the Higher Education Act, the Department of Edu-
cation interpreted the statute to require hearings only for "determinations other than
eligibility." Id. at 884 (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit stated that:
There is probably no word or phrase around which parties could not spin conflict-
ing meanings, given the opportunity and incentive. However, even given this limi-
tation to 'plain language' arguments generally, this case presents as clear an ex-
ample of an administrative interpretation that contravenes plain statutory
language as we are likely to see.
Id.
113. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (emphasis added).
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mandate, courts should "butt out."
In the two years following Chevron, the government won all but one
Chevron case."' A 1988 study for the Administrative Conference con-
cluded that "Chevron significantly altered the proportion of agency
cases affirmed by the appellate courts over a period of time during
which judicial memberships and preferences apparently were stable.""'
There is little doubt that during these two years the lower courts took
the Chevron doctrine to heart.
Cases subsequent to the courts' honeymoon with Chevron indicate
that the Supreme Court rejected an overly simplistic adherence to
Chevron deference. After all, there is a limit to judicial abnegation;
defer as much as you will, but at some point the courts are in the busi-
ness of interpreting statutes. Ultimately under our constitutional sys-
tem, the courts have the final say on the meaning of laws.",
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,17 the Court stated that where a "pure
question of statutory construction" is at issue, courts, "[e]mploying
traditional tools of statutory construction,""' are the final authority.
114. Starr, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39
ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 361 (1987).
Of course, the pre-Chevron approach to questions of deference was certainly not uni-
form. Professor Robert Anthony has observed that judicial attitudes before Chevron
"range from a near-abject acceptance, to a skeptical consideration of agency views, to
an ignoring of them altogether." Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6 (1990) (footnotes omitted). For a
useful analysis of pre-Chevron deference, see Jordan, Deference Revisited: Politics as a
Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus,
68 NEB. L. REV. 454, 458-73 (1989).
115. Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
116. Judge Breyer has pointed out that:
Carrying out the ordinary judicial appellate task involves looking to both facts
and existing law; looking to both equity in the particular case and the need for
uniform, effective and fair rules applicable to similar cases; and looking to the
development of a fair rule of decision for the individual case that does not tangle
the web of existing interpretations, including interpretations of rules, standards,
statutory meanings and interpretive practices. Added to this set of factors are the
need for reasonably expeditious decisions so that agencies can act, the need to
resolve individual challenges fairly, and the vast range of different litigation con-
texts in which questions of statutory interpretation can arise.
These factors will tend to force a less univocal, less far-reaching interpretation
of Chevron and the other "show deference on questions of law" cases. Inevitably,
one suspects, we will find the courts actually following more varied approaches,
sometimes deferring to agency interpretations, sometimes not, depending upon
the statute, the question, the context, and what "makes sense" in the particular
litigation, in light of the basic statute and its purposes.
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 380-
81 (1986).
117. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
118. Id. at 446 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
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However, in the "process of case-by-case adjudication,"' courts must
respect the interpretations made by the agencies "[iln that process of
filling 'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.' """a While
concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia called this approach an
"evisceration" of Chevron."' He complained that
the Court... implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute
for that of an agency whenever ... they are able to reach a conclusion as to the
proper interpretation of the statute. But this approach would make deference a
doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise
be unable to construe the enactment at issue."
S
Shortly thereafter, a unanimous Court, in NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union,'" applied the Chevron distinction be-
tween "a pure question of statutory construction,"" 4 and situations in
which the statute "is silent or ambiguous."16 In United Food, the
Court upheld the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulations
that precluded formal NLRB approval, and hence, judicial review, of
the NLRB General Counsel's decision to reach an informal prehearing
settlement of an unfair labor complaint. Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, pointed primarily to Cardoza-Fonseca, and relied on "the
words, structure, and history"' 26 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act Amendments, stating that when a statute is silent, the "task under
Cardoza-Fonseca and Chevron is not judicially to categorize each
agency determination, but rather to decide whether the agency's regu-
latory placement is permissible.""1
S7
In a sardonic concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor, characterized the
Court's opinion as demonstrating "the continuing and unchanged vital-
ity of the test for judicial review of agency determinations of law set
forth in [Chevron]."118 Scalia criticized "[s]ome courts" for following
the "dicta"' of Cardoza-Fonseca, and asserted that if the "dicta" of
cil, 467 U.S. 421, 843 n.9 (1984)).
119. Id. at 448.
120. Id. at 448 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
121. Id. at 454 (concurring opinion).
122. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (citation omitted).
123. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
124. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US. at 446. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (stating
that "the judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction..
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
126. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 124
(1987).
127. Id. at 125.




that case, rather than its "expressed adherence to Chevron" were fol-
lowed, the question at issue would have been "'a pure question of stat-
utory construction' rather than the application of a 'standard to a par-
ticular set of facts,' as to which 'the courts must respect the
interpretation of the agency.' "130
In light of these cases, it is not surprising that lower court decisions
no longer consistently defer to agency statutory interpretations., In
Costello v. Agency for International Development,382 for example, the
District of Columbia Circuit refused to accept the Foreign Service
Grievance Board's interpretation of the statutory term "grievance," re-
lying expressly on Cardoza-Fonseca for its observation that the case
presented "a pure question of statutory construction."' 33
In contrast, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA,' " the
District of Columbia Circuit declined to repeat the "basic legal error"
of adopting a "static judicial definition" that had led to reversal in
Chevron. Instead, it reversed its own precedent regarding the construc-
tion of a particular statutory term, because subsequent to the first deci-
sion the agency had changed its position on the statute's interpretation.
The court observed that, since Chevron, it is "now clearly the preroga-
tive of the agency to bring its own expertise to bear upon the resolution
of ambiguities in the statute that Congress has charged it to adminis-
ter."' 3 5 This is true even when an agency alters its interpretation of a
statute based on the nature of the issues raised. 136
130. Id. at 134 (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446, 448) (citations omitted).
131. District of Columbia Circuit Chief Judge Wald has observed:
[lur circuit initially took a fairly rigid approach to [Chevronl, deferring to
agencies in a wide array of situations. This highly deferential approach peaked in
the case of National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC where the court held that
Chevron deference applied not only to agency statutory constructions, but even to
an agency's interpretation of private contracts involving "'pure' questions of
law."
Today, however, our court seems to be inching back towards a more balanced
stance, allowing greater space for judicial legal interpretations and moving away
from complete deference to the agency. In part we are emboldened by the Su-
preme Court's decision . . .in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, which held that the
court should decide for itself the 'pure question of statutory construction . .. .'
Wald, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L.
REv. 507, 529-30 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
132. 843 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
133. Id. at 542.
134. 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 1482.
136. Id. at 1481. But see Maislin Indus., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., - U.S..-
110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990) (holding that no deference is due where agency changes inter-
pretation of law where text is unchanged, even if it argued that overall regulatory
scheme has been altered).
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Other recent cases suggest that the Supreme Court has not settled on
one view of Chevron. In Dole v. United Steelworkers of America137 the
Court applied a "weak" Chevron approach in an opinion by Justice
Brennan in which Justice Scalia joined,' " over a strong dissent by Jus-
tice White, who would have used the "strong" approach and deferred
to the agency's "longstanding and consistently applied interpreta-
tion.' 89 On the same day, however, the Court also handed down Sulli-
van v. Everhart,"0 in which Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, ap-
plied a "strong" Chevron analysis and upheld an agency
-interpretation4 1 on the ground that the statutory language "reasonably
bears the Secretary's interpretation.""" Justice Stevens, in dissent with
Justice Brennan, characterized the opinion as allowing the Secretary
"kingly powers to rewrite history,"" 8 and would not have permitted the
acceptance of agency construction of statutes until the court employed
"traditional tools of statutory construction."
' 1 "'
It is, I think, a mistake-and it certainly is premature-to view the
development of "strong" and "weak" interpretations of Chevron as sig-
nifying the eventual demise of Chevron deference. Rather, this develop-
ment should be viewed as a refinement of the doctrine necessary to
accommodate conflicting pressures and functions of reviewing courts,
and the nature of the cases before them." 5 It also reflects the fact that
"verbal formulas [and] general principles only take us so far."' 6
Occasionally, the structure of agency rulemaking and adjudication
processes can make a straightforward application of Chevron exceed-
ingly difficult. I refer to the so-called "split-function" or "split-enforce-
ment" model, where adjudication of enforcement functions under a
regulatory statute are lodged in an administrative agency that is wholly
separate from the agency that writes regulations and prosecutes
violations.
The "split-function" model is of relatively recent origin. One exam-
ple is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a
137. - U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990).
138. Id. at 934, 937-38.
139. Id. at 939.
140. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990).
141. Id. at 964-66.
142. Id. at 966.
143. Id. at 968 (maintaining such powers under Chevron deference).
144. Id. at 971 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
145. Breyer, supra note 116, at 373-80.
146. See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980)




division of the Department of Labor (DOL), which is responsible for
promulgating and enforcing health and safety standards, while the in-
dependent three-member Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC) adjudicates contested OSHA citations. Simi-
larly, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, also in the DOL,
promulgates safety and health standards for the mining industry, while
the five-member Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
adjudicates cases brought to enforce these standards. 1 7 Again, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the power to suspend or
revoke airmen certificates,14 8 while the certificate holder may appeal
the FAA's order to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Appeals are assigned to an administrative law judge who conducts a de
novo review. 1 9
Where enforcement is split, the issue becomes to whose interpreta-
tion does a reviewing court owe Chevron deference? In Martin v. Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Commission,'" the Court recently
resolved a split in the circuits on the question of whether to defer to an
OSHA or OSHRC interpretation"' in favor of OSHA. The Court
147. For a discussion of the operation of these statutory schemes, see Johnson, The
Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Exper-
iences, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 315 (1987).
148. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429 (1988).
149. For an analysis of this enforcement model, see Fallon, Enforcing Aviation
Safety Regulations: The Case for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adjudication,
4 ADMIN. L.J. 3 (1991).
150. 59 U.S.L.W. 4197 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991).
151. The split between the circuits can be traced to Donovan v. A. Amorello &
Sons, 761 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1985), which found that the Secretary's interpretation of
the regulation was reasonable and, after reviewing the statutory functions of Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRC), held that OSHA's interpretation should control. Id. at
66. Judge Breyer was influenced not only by the fact that Congress gave OSHA the
broad policy-setting function, in contrast to OSHRC's fact-based adjudicative function,
but also because OSHA employees had chosen the language of the regulation and,
therefore, were "more likely to have an institutional memory of the regulation's pur-
poses and meaning." Id. at 66.
Some circuits followed the First Circuit's holding that courts should defer to
OSHA's interpretations. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Schuylkill Metals Corp., 828
F.2d 314, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1987); Brock v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y, 820 F.2d 909,
912 (7th Cir. 1987). Cf. Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (deferring to Secretary over Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission in case brought under Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act).
However, six circuits chose to defer to OSHRC's respective interpretations. See, e.g.,
Dole v. Occupational Safety Health Review Comm'n, 891 F.2d 1495, 1497 (10th Cir.
1989) (citing Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit opinions in Brock v.
Bechtel Power Corp., 985 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1986)); Usery v. Hermitage
Concrete Pipe Co., 584 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Giles & Cotting,
Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1974) (showing example of where court de-
ferred to OSHRC).
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unanimously held, based on the legislative history of the Occupational
Safety and Health (OSH) Act, that Congress "did not intend to sever
the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act regulations from the
Secretary's power to promulgate and enforce them.""" The Court ex-
plicitly refrained from taking a position "on the division of enforcement
and interpretative powers within other regulatory schemes that conform
to the split enforcement structure." 18 Further, the Court saw no obvi-
ous barriers to Congress dividing those powers as it sees fit. It thus
appears that the issue of "who gets the deference" is itself a matter of
statutory interpretation.
The matter was further elaborated in Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines,
Inc.' " Faced with having to choose between two agencies that had ad-
ministered the Black Lung benefits program,1 5 the Court deferred to
the DOL's view that its interim regulations under the program did not
violate a statutory requirement that they "not be more restrictive"15 6
than the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's (HEW)
older interim regulations. 161 Rejecting Justice Scalia's view that the
DOL was engaged in a "cross-border attack,"' " and that only the
agency that drafted the regulations was entitled to deference in inter-
It should be noted that the Administrative Conference of the United States (Admin-
istrative Conference) considered this issue in 1986 and concluded that, in general,
under the split-enforcement function model, Congress should require that the adjudica-
tory agency accept the rulemaking agency's interpretation of a rule unless that inter-
pretation is "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." THE
SPLIT-ENFORCEMENT MODEL FOR AGENCY ADJUDICATION, ACUS RECOMMENDATION
86-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1991).
152. Martin, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4201.
153. Id.
154. 59 U.S.L.W. 4778 (U.S. June 24, 1991).
155. The program was first administered by the Social Security Administration
under the auspices of the then-existent Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), and later by the Department of Labor (DOL). The Black Lung benefits pro-
gram was enacted originally as Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (codified in scattered sections
of 30 U.S.C. (1988)). Pauley. v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4778, 4779
(U.S. June 24, 1991).
156. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1988), as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Re-
form Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2, 92 Stat. 95 (1978). Congress authorized
the two departments, during their respective tenures, to adopt interim regulations gov-
erning the adjudication of claims for black lung benefits. The amendments of 1977
specified that DOL regulations regarding criteria of eligibility for benefits were not to
be more restrictive than HEW's. Pauley, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4779.
157. Specifically at issue, the DOL interim regulations added three methods of in-
voking the presumptions of eligibility for claimants under the program which were not
included in the HEW interim regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.203(a)(3), (4), (5) (1991),
and two additional methods for rebutting these presumptions, id. at §§ 727.203(b)(1),
(2). Pauley, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4780.
158. Pauley, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4785.
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preting them, the majority found that Congress declined to require the
DOL to adopt the old HEW regulations but refused to give the DOL a
free hand in writing new regulations. "[T]he Secretary's authority to
promulgate interim regulations 'not . . . more restrictive than' the
HEW regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW's
regulations and the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based
on a reasonable interpretation thereof."18' Possibly implicit in the
Court's decision favoring the newer regulations, in this instance those
of the DOL, is its preference to give deference to current political
judgements as an appropriate means of effectuating the legislative will.
In cautioning against a rigid application of Chevron principles, Pro-
fessor Schwartz suggests that Chevron blurs the distinction between
law and fact upon which the scope of review had been grounded. He
believes that Chevron errs by drastically limiting review, not only of
agency findings of fact, but also of agency construction of statutory
law. 160 Indeed, he argues that Chevron, and an earlier case, Gray v.
Powell"" which Schwartz designated as Chevron's progenitor, " "is in-
consistent with the very basis of the law of judicial review."16 Profes-
sor Schwartz is not alone in viewing Chevron as a power shift to the
Executive. Professors Shapiro and Glicksman similarly suggest that:
If Congress becomes fully aware of the Court's shift to executive implementation
review, it may conclude that the only way to limit agency discretion is to aban-
don the discretionary model of delegated power, since the courts will no longer
actively ensure that agencies adhere to congressional intent.'"
These fears, however, are not justified by recent application of the doc-
trine. To some small degree, of course, Chevron could be mitigated if
Congress were to delegate its statutory authority more precisely. The
need for more precise delegation, however, is a wish often made, but
rarely fulfilled. At the same time, however, agencies can contribute to
reducing Chevron uncertainty by claiming Chevron deference only for
agency positions developed by using "procedures authorized by Con-
159. Id. at 4783.
160. Regarding construction of statutes, "[uinder the traditional theory of Anglo-
American judicial review, [these] are matters more legal than factual in nature and
hence are open for determination by the courts upon review." Schwartz, supra note 1,
at 567.
161. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
162. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 560-61.
163. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 568.
164. Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court and the Quiet Revolu-
tion in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 871. See Mikva, How Should the
Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (discussing
changing relationship between courts and administrative agencies).
1991]
372 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL
gress for, and otherwise appropriate to, the development of definitive
agency statutory interpretations." 16 Agency adherence to such proce-
dures will ensure that a position is sufficiently definitive 1" to deserve
Chevron deference without judicial reinforcement. Such agency disci-
pline, however, may be too much to expect.
Moreover, there are good reasons why Chevron should have a lasting
effect on judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. Indeed, the
root of Chevron deference may lie in the Supreme Court's recognition
that its own "practical inability, in most cases, to give its own precise
renditions of statutory meaning virtually assures that circuit readings
will be diverse.1 267 Thus, Chevron may reflect the Court's recognition
that it is preferable to allow a single agency decisionmaker an accept-
able range of discretion, rather than trying to squeeze uniformity from
the decisions of a multitude of federal appeals court judges. And lastly,
of course, Chevron rejects the intrusive "hard look" approach to judi-
cial review so prevalent in the 1970's.
C. Presidential Oversight of Rulemaking
If some observers are suspicious that Chevron marks a decrease in
congressional control over the administrative process, others have
raised concerns that increased Presidential oversight of the rulemaking
process reduces the range of agency autonomy. Here, the critics con-
tend that with the imposition of a White House rulemaking agenda the
agencies themselves have lost control over the regulatory process. As
the administrative state has become more complex, we have exper-
ienced a veritable regulatory explosion. Centralized coordination of the
regulatory process is considered by many to be inevitable given "[t]he
President's statutory responsibilities and political accountability for
making balancing choices among competing national goals."' " In
165. ACHIEVING JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TIONS, ACUS RECOMMENDATION 89-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.89-5 (1991). See generally
Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts, 7 YALE J.
ON REG. 1 (1990) (examining extent to which agencies' statutory interpretation should
be given consideration by reviewing courts).
166. Definitive statements can, of course, be presented in informal formats. See
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568-69 (1980) (holding Truth in
Lending Act did not mandate general rule of disclosure for acceleration clause, and
therefore, court must defer to Federal Reserve Board staffs interpretation of Act).
167. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Su-
preme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987).
168. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON LAW AND ECONOMY, FEDERAL
REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM, FINAL REPORT 83 (1979). See PRESIDENTIAL RE-
VIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING, ACUS RECOMMENDATION 88-9, 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-9
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truth, this seeming swing of the pendulum toward Presidential over-
sight is simply the continuation of relatively steady movement in this
direction over the past two decades.
In 1971, President Nixon, in an effort to gain some control over the
administrative state instituted a "Quality of Life" review program,
under which all "significant" draft, proposed, and final rules in the ar-
eas of environmental quality, consumer protection, and aspects of pub-
lic health and safety first were submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). 16' President Ford strengthened OMB oversight
with an Executive order requiring agencies to submit inflation impact
statements for each proposed major rule prior to publication." 0 In
1978, President Carter significantly expanded this oversight effort by
requiring detailed regulatory analyses of proposed major agency rules,
review of selected major rules by the newly created Regulatory Analy-
sis Review Group and Regulatory Council, and semi-annual publica-
tion of a calendar of federal regulations then under development.17
Almost immediately after taking office, President Reagan issued Ex-
ecutive Order 12,291'17 which required executive branch agencies,
when proposing certain "major rules," to observe unless precluded by
law, specified cost/benefit formulae in accompanying Regulatory Im-
pact Analyses. Moreover, it required submission to OMB of all pro-
posed and final rules, and any accompanying impact analyses, sixty
days prior to their publication. Under the terms of the Executive order,
OMB may, barring statutory or judicial deadlines, withhold publication
of the proposed or final rule. A subsequent Executive order required
agencies to submit an annual "draft regulatory program" for OMB ap-
proval, to "ensure that each major step in the process of rule develop-
ment is consistent with Administration policy.
'
"173
In 1980, the Paperwork Reduction Act17' established the Office of
(1991) (asserting that Presidential review should apply generally to federal rulemaking
and describing process whereby review would occur subject to certain procedural
limitations).
169. See J. QUARLES, CLEANING Up AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 117-42 (1976) (stating that in practice, regulatory
scheme of EPA was principal recipient of attention under this program).
170. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1904 (1976), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1017 (1976).
171. Federal Regulatory Management, Memorandum for the President, 4
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1905 (Oct. 31, 1978); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed.
Reg. 152 (1978) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981)).
172. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601, note at 473-76 (1988).
173. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601, note at 476-77 (1988).
174. Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified at 44
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Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB, whose re-
sponsibility was to track and review agency activities. OIRA quickly
became the focal point for White House oversight of the regulatory
process. OIRA has been praised as the solution to burdensome, over-
lapping, and uncoordinated regulation. It has also been condemned as a
"black hole" for regulatory proposals,' 7 ' in an attempt by the Execu-
tive to impose ideological and political perspectives on the regulatory
process to the point of subverting legislative intent and agency responsi-
bility and as an attempt to kill legitimate regulations before they get a
public airing.1 76  A related complaint is that OIRA uses delay as a
weapon in the policy debate.
1 77
In recent reauthorization hearings, OIRA assured Congress that
whether or not these practices occurred, they are not in current use.' 7
8
Present OIRA procedures17' require it to review regulations within a
statutory period and require a docket system with files open to public
scrutiny after the rule in question is published." 0 Once fear of OIRA
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988)). The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) is overseen in addition to the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
director, by the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, established by Exec.
Order No. 12,291, supra, note 172. That Task Force has been succeeded by the Coun-
cil on Competitiveness, established by President Bush on March 31, 1989. See THE
VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, FACT SHEET ON THE
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS (April 12, 1989) (explaining workings of Council on
Competitiveness). There has been some concern that the Council is, in fact, truncating
the OMB review process as it is not subject to any of the disclosure of the OIRA
process. See Victor Quayle's Quiet Coup, NAT'L J. 1676 (July 6, 1991) (noting Vice-
President Quayle's role in Council on Competitiveness).
175. Reauthorization of Appropriation For the Paperwork Reduction Act: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Government Operations, at 8 (Aug. 2, 1989) (statement
of the Hon. S. Jay Plager) (unprinted hearing) [hereinafter Statement of the Hon. S.
Jay Plager]. See also O'Connor, OMB Involvement in FDA Drug Regulations: Regu-
lating the Regulators, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 175, 194 (1988) (stating that "Congress-
men characterized OMB as a swamp").
176. See generally Reauthorization of OMB's Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs: Hearings on S. 1742 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (hereinafter OIRA Hearing] (discussing role and future
of OIRA). See Morrison, OMB Interference With Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986) (arguing that OMB in-
volvement in rulemaking process is unwarranted).
177. CIRA Hearing, supra note 176, at 15-59.
178. Besides the Paperwork Reduction Act, supra note 174, OIRA has general reg-
ulatory authority under Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498. Thus, the decision
whether to reauthorize OIRA does not materially affect White House control over
agency rulemaking.
179. See Paperwork Reduction Act, supra note 174 (enumerating OIRA purpose
and procedures).
180. Additionally, the Hon. S. Jay Plager, Administrator of OIRA, 1988-1989,
specifically addressed the question of external influence on OIRA's review:
First of all, as soon as a regulation comes over to us for official review, my entire
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as a "black hole" is dispelled, the coordination issue becomes less
controversial.1 81
While some worries remain unalleviated,' 81 the basic premises under-
lying OIRA's creation seem to have been accepted, namely that the
administrative state and its bureaucratic offspring are growing ever
larger and more sophisticated, and that some coordinating mechanism
is consequently necessary to ensure regulatory accountability. Coordi-
nation and oversight of the regulatory process will likely be with us for
the foreseeable future, as will the enhanced role the White House plays
in this process.
II. THE STRUCTURES OF ADJUDICATION
A. Courts and Agencies
As both judges and lawyers continually note, we face an imminent
crisis in our civil justice system, caused in large part by rapidly increas-
ing costs and caseloads. Fundamental restructuring is necessary. Such
efforts must include a review of the role of the administrative judici-
ary-which already adjudicates many times the caseload of the federal
courts. "' It is no virtue to move cases from the federal courts to the
administrative law system, blithely assuming that the problem of case
overload has been solved.'" Unless the administrative agency's adjudi-
staff, with two exceptions, are muzzled. That is, they are not allowed to talk to
anyone outside the government about a regulation that is under review .... [The
two exceptions are] my deputy, and the other is myself. If we are visited by any
private industry or business interest, or for that matter public interest representa-
tive, concerning that regulation, any documents we get are immediately sent to
the agency for inclusion in the public record. Any meetings we hold, we invite
the agencies and give them the opportunity to participate in the meeting with us,
make record, and put that in the public record.
Statement of the Hon. S. Jay Plager, supra note 175, at 8.
181. On the subject of using undue delay as a policy weapon, the Hon. S. Jay
Plager states, "My own view of it is that purposeful delay is bad public policy. You
ought to confront the issue and make a decision. And it is even worse politics because
you will keep getting caught in delay, and it is not a good way to operate a government.
So to the extent delay was ever used as a policy device, it is not now used." Plager,
Agency Diplomacy: Relations with Congress and the White House, and Ethic in the
Administrative Process, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 5, 17 (1990).
182. Congressional delay in confirming a new OIRA Administrator has been cited
as evidence that Congress does not trust OIRA not to revert to using delay as a politi-
cal tactic. However, this delay by Congress creates nothing but a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy since OIRA cannot be expected to work efficiently without an administrator.
183. See Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the
Trees, 31 FED. B. NEws & J. 383, 384 (1984) [hereinafter Federal Agency Adjudica-
tions] (noting number of cases handled by Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) in 1978
versus 1983-1984).
184. Cf. Address by Robert Bork, "Dealing with the Overload in Article III
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catory scheme is in fact less costly and complex than article III adjudi-
cation, that solution only hides litigation overload, it does not resolve it.
Administrative agency adjudications are functionally judicial in
character and part of the same adjudicatory continuum as article I and
even article III courts. All provide parties with a forum for dispute
resolution, though they range widely in jurisdiction, formality, and re-
viewability. This functional similarity has caused considerable debate
on the proper location or "venue" for administrative adjudication. The
Administrative Conference, for example, has urged for years that au-
thority to enforce civil penalties be placed in the agency rather than
federal district court. 18 6 Last year, following the Administrative Con-
ference's recommendation, Congress gave the SEC authority to impose
civil penalties administratively, rather than through de novo district
court enforcement proceedings.'
Another aspect of the "location" dispute is illustrated by the debate
over the proper enforcement structure for those new provisions of the
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 198887 which make housing dis-
crimination punishable by a civil penalty. One group, led by then Assis-
tant Attorney General for Civil Rights, W. Bradford Reynolds, argued
that complainants should first try conciliation. Only if conciliation ef-
forts failed, should the parties be able to seek redress in federal district
court.' " Civil rights attorneys, on the other hand, preferred adjudica-
tion before an administrative law judge (ALJ), whose decisions could
be reviewed in a federal court of appeals.lsa The resulting compromise
Courts," National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 79, 238 (1976) (pro-
posing that "an Article III court is realistically not required [in a variety of] ... cases
that can be handled as justly by a person resembling an administrative law judge as an
Article III judge").
185. CIvIL MONEY PENALTIES AS A SANCTION, ACUS RECOMMENDATION 72-6, 1
C.F.R. § 305.72-6 (1991); AGENCY ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION OF CIVIL MONEY
PENALTIES ACUS RECOMMENDATION 79-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-3 (1991). See Malloy,
Balancing Public Confidence and Confidentiality: Adjudication Practices and Proce-
dures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 723 (1988) (dis-
cussing regulation of federal banks and who should have control over them).
186. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Title
IX, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
187. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631).
188. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 588 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 331-336 (1987) (statement of W. Bradford Reynolds, Ass't Atty. General for
Civil Rights).
189. See Statement of Jack Greenberg of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. reprinted in Hearings on S. 558 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 77
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reached requires enforcement proceedings before a Department of
Housing and Urban Development AL, 90 but provides for a "removal"
right to district court, exercisable by either party.1 1 This resolution
indicates but one of many venue-possibilities available along the adju-
dicatory continuum.
Sometimes "location" disputes concern which agency is the most ap-
propriate adjudicative forum, as in the current debate over whether the
FAA or the NTSB should adjudicate civil penalty enforcement cases
for aviation safety violations.19' Sometimes, the location dispute probes
the extent of administrative agency delegation. Until struck down in
Coit Independent Joint Venture v. Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corp.,' the now defunct Federal Home Loan Bank Board as-
serted its ability to hear and resolve claims against its component unit,
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), acting
in its capacity as receiver of a failed thrift. The Court held that the
agency could not assert such jurisdictional authority at the expense of
claimants' rights to litigate the issue in federal or state court. However,
the Court noted that if Congress had specifically authorized the agency
to resolve the claims, such delegation would be valid.
The perceived need for additional procedural safeguards beyond
those found in agency adjudication has already led to additions to the
article I court system-legislatively created courts which, like agencies,
perform specialized judicial functions.'" The newest article I court is
(1987) (urging de novo proceeding in federal court for prevailing complainant in AU
proceeding and stating that House Report also noted that "the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights favors Administrative Enforcement (ALJs)").
190. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8(2), 102 Stat. 1629 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b)
(1988)).
191. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8(2), 102 Stat. 1629 (1988) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3612(e)).
192. See generally Fallon, Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: A Case for the
Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 389 (1991) (ad-
dressing civil penalty enforcement adjudication). As a further example, in its tentative
recommendations, the Federal Courts Study Committee made a similar proposal for
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Title VII employment discrimi-
nation cases. Instead of moving automatically to litigation in district court, the Com-
mittee proposed that the EEOC be authorized to track the procedure of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and adjudicate wrongful discharge cases, rendering
decisions that would be reviewable by circuit courts under traditional administrative
law principles. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 49-50 (Dec. 22, 1989). In its final report, the Committee re-
vised its recommendations to provide instead for voluntary arbitration of these cases by
the EEOC. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 60-61 (Apr. 2,
1990).
193. Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561
(1989).
194. The concept of article I courts is fully discussed in Dreyfuss, Specialized Ad-
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the United States Court of Veterans Appeals,'9 6 providing judicial re-
view of Board of Veterans Appeals decisions regarding benefit claims.
Recent years have seen a questioning of the constitutional underpin-
ning of article I "legislative" courts. Traditional doctrine held that
while some "core" judicial functions belong to article III courts, other
activities in which courts engage might be hived off to non-article III
tribunals.'" The traditional "bright line" test for such delegations is
found in Murray's Lessee,' " where the Court distinguished between
"private rights," involving liability of one private individual to another
historically sounding in common law, equity, or admiralty, and "public
rights" which are "susceptible of judicial determination, but which
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the [article
III] courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.""" The dis-
tinction gave Congress more flexibility in determining the sort of adju-
dicatory system it wished to see handle a given type of matter.
Invoking the Murray's Lessee distinction in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Review Commission,'" the Supreme
Court upheld the assignment of imposing civil money penalties to an
administrative agency2" against a challenge that the court violated the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The Court noted that "when
Congress creates new statutory 'public rights' it may assign their adju-
dication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be
incompatible without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction
that a jury trial be 'preserved' in 'suits at common law.' " 01 This read-
ing of the "public rights" concept established a significant opening for
legislatively-created courts .*' The notion was further expanded in
judications, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377. See Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice, 76
Nw. U.L. REv. 745 (1981) (proposing choice between specialized courts and tradi-
tional courts); Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1990) (discussing issues of specialized review and adminis-
trative action).
195. Veteran's Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
196. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (upholding
legislative creation of special territorial court).
197. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1856).
198. Id. at 284.
199. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442 (1977).
200. Id. at 449-50.
201. Id. at 455.
202. More than a decade later, the Supreme Court held that a jury trial is required
if Congress places a penalty action in the courts. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
422-25 (1987). But the Court reaffirmed Atlas Roofing, holding that Congress may
choose alternatively to place penalty actions in administrative agencies without violat-
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Thomas v. Union Carbide Agriculture Products Co.,208 which found
that "public rights" can be expected to include cases in which the gov-
ernment is not a party when
Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional pow-
ers under Article I ...create[s] a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for
agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.*"
These decisions provided Congress with substantial flexibility in as-
signing adjudication procedures to agencies, as well as article I and
article III courts. This flexibility would allow Congress to supplant a
common law cause of action with a statutory cause of action which
would be heard in a non-article III tribunal. Indeed, in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court held that where a
claim can be adjudicated in a non-article III tribunal, common law
counterclaims based on the very same transaction can be directed to
the non-article III tribunal as well.
205
Until recently, little thought was given to the definition of a "public"
right. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,' s the Supreme Court de-
cided that a person sued by a bankruptcy trustee for recovery of an
allegedly fraudulent monetary transfer is entitled to a jury trial under
the seventh amendment, notwithstanding the bankruptcy statutes' as-
signment of such actions to adjudication by non-article III bankruptcy
judges.'0 7 Basing its analysis on scholarly interpretations of eighteenth
century equity jurisprudence, the Court determined that a "private
right" was implicated in such an action, thus triggering a seventh
amendment jury trial right.' " While Congress has some room to "de-
vise novel causes of action involving public rights," the Court held that
"it lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private right of
ing the seventh amendment. Id.
203. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
204. Id. at 593-94.
205. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-57 (1986).
The Court noted that the factors to be examined in article III challenges to such an
arrangement are:
[TIhe extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power" are reserved to
Article III courts, and conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum
exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the con-
cerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article IIl.
Id. at 851.
206. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
207. Id. at 35.
208. Id. at 43-47.
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their constitutional right to a trial by jury." 2 " In addition, the holding
in Granfinanciera raised significant questions as to the meaning of non-
article III adjudications, be they by ALJs or article I courts.2 10
Unlike Thomas, which dealt with article III challenges,
Granfinanciera encompassed a seventh amendment right, leaving open
the question of whether the seventh amendment or article III allows
jury trials in actions to be held before non-article III bankruptcy
judges."1 That "open" issue was reached in In re Ben Cooper, Inc.,2 2
where the Second Circuit ordered the bankruptcy court to conduct a
jury trial of a Chapter 11 contract dispute. If sustained on remand,
such a result would certainly muddy the distinction between article III
and non-article III courts.21
Granfinanciera also leaves unresolved the question, advanced in ear-
lier cases such as Crowell v. Benson,1"' as to whether the use of non-
article III triers of fact requires an opportunity for article III appellate
review. This question affects the entire structure of the administrative
judiciary."' Can we, for example, reassign, by legislative fiat, environ-
mental crimes or entitlement disputes away from article III courts in
209. Id. at 50-52.
210. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52 (1989). Conceptually,
Granfinanciera, and its predecessors Thomas and Schor, placed the decision of what
litigation is required to be tried in an article III forum in the hands of Congress, a
result that appears at odds with the constitutional scheme.
211. Id. at 36. Jury trials have been upheld in article I courts. See Collins v. Fore-
man, 729 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding constitutionality of act allowing magis-
trates to conduct jury or nonjury trials).
212. In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc., - U.S. _ 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990),
reinstated on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3770
(U.S. May 14, 1991). The Court vacated its decision to grant certiorari after the Solic-
itor General urged that the proceeding was "related to," rather than "arose under"
Chapter 11, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1988). See Brief for the United
States at 6-7, In re Ben Cooper, Inc., - U.S. _ 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990), reinstated
on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3770 (U.S. May 14,
1991). But see In re United Mo. Bank, 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding bank-
ruptcy judges could not preside over jury trials in preference action); In re Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Frates, 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding bankruptcy judges could not
preside over jury trials). Cf Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding bankruptcy judges cannot conduct jury trials in proceedings not deemed "core
proceedings" under bankruptcy statutes).
213. As Justice Scalia points out in his concurrence in Granfinanciera, "[tihe no-
tion that the power to adjudicate a legal controversy between two private parties may
be assigned to a non-Article I1, yet federal, tribunal is entirely inconsistent with the
origins of the public rights doctrine." Granfinanceria, 492 U.S. at 66 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). This reasoning would also undermine the rationale in Schor.
214. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
215. See Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,




order to keep caseload down? Is there any limit to the sanctions and
economic penalties one could suffer in less formal non-article III con-
texts? Where Congress has given new adjudicative responsibilities to
either legislative courts or administrative agencies, some kind of article
III "bite" would be prudent, even if not constitutionally required, at
least with respect to questions of law.
B. ALJs and Judges
Any discussion of the proper venue for resolving administrative law
disputes must also consider the changed role of ALJs since the enact-
ment of the APA"' in 1946. At that time, the majority of ALJs were
employed by economic regulatory agencies, serving as "initial de-
cider[s] of regulatory policy issues.""' Today, however, the bulk of the
ALJs' caseload can be fairly categorized as benefit or enforcement
cases that involve fact determination, not policy articulation. 1 8
The numbers have changed as well. In 1947, there were approxi-
mately two hundred ALJs (albeit by another name).'' By 1991, there
were more than five times that number." 0 This does not mean that the
numbers will continue to significantly increase-and on this point I
must differ from Professor Schwartz, who envisions a federal adminis-
trative judiciary of several thousand in the next century."' Indeed, the
total number of federal ALJs"2 has not increased since 1984, when
216. 5 U.S.C. §§ 557-559 (1988).
217. See Federal Agency Adjudication, supra note 183, at 383, 385 (noting at that
time, 64% of all ALJs were concentrated in economic regulatory agencies, serving as
"initial decider[s] of regulatory policy issues;" today, suggests author, ALJ role has
shifted primarily to that of "dispenser of disability benefits of arbiter of civil money
penalties--cases where factfinding, demeanor evidence, fairness and speed are
hallmarks, and policy issues absent or submerged").
218. See Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the
Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 268-72 (1981) [hereinafter Unifed Corps of ALJs]
(citing statistics of reduced role of regulatory adjudication); Levant, A Unified Corps
of Administrative Law Judges-The Transition from a Concept to an Eventual Real-
ity, 6 W. Naw ENG. L. REv. 705, 709 (1984) (asserting that majority of ALJ proceed-
ings have shifted from regulatory to enforcement actions).
219. The APA originally used the term "examiner." This was changed to "hearing
examiner" in 1966. It was then changed to "administrative law judge" in 1972, and the
APA was so amended in 1978. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus
on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110 n.8 (1981).
220. Data provided by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, Office of Person-
nel Management establishes the number of ALJs at 1,090 as of March 25, 1991 (avail-
able at the Administrative Conference).
221. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 569. He further predicts that "[t]he justice now
dispensed by administrative agencies may become truly judicialized and administered
by judges possessing solely judicial authority." Id. at 570.
222. In June 1984, there were 1,121 ALJs, Lubbers, supra note 171, at 384, com-
pared to 1,100 ALJs in August 1990, supra note 220. It should be noted that, in addi-
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Professor Schwartz published the second edition of his administrative
law text. s
Even as the numbers remain steady, the status of ALJs continues to
grow. In 1972, their title was upgraded from "hearing examiner."""
Last year, they received a new pay formula, pegging their salary to a
stated percentage of the Senior Executive Service pay scale .2 ALJs
possess considerable independence under the protections provided by
the APA." Only a handful of ALJs have been removed under APA
guidelines." 7 Unlike federal trial judges, however, ALJ opinions can be
reviewed essentially de novo by the agency head." 8 Indeed, the policy
tion to the numerous ALJs, there were also approximately 550 non-ALJ administrative
judges in 1986. Robie & Morse, The Federal Executive Branch Adjudicator: Alive
(and) Well Outside the Administrative Procedure Act?, 33 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 133,
134-35 (1986).
223. B. SCHWARTZ, ADmNISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1984). Schwartz' article seeks
to cover developments since the 1984 publication. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 543.
224. See supra note 219 (noting progressive change in title of ALJs). This change
suggested a more formalized position. The legislative history indicates that one of the
catalysts for this change was the necessity to "eliminate confusion on the part of the
public about the role played by those officers." S. REP. No. 697, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIN. NEWS 496, 499.
225. Federal Employees' Pay Comparability Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509, §
104, 104 Stat. 1427, 1445 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5372).
226. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1988) (stating ALJ may not be responsible to, or
be subject to supervision by, anyone performing investigative or prosecutorial functions
for agency); 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1988) (stating ALJs receive their pay as prescribed by
Office of Personnel Management, independent of agency ratings or recommendations);
5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988) (stating disciplinary action may be taken against ALJ only for
good cause established and determined by Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) on
record after opportunity for hearing before MSPB).
In Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.
1984), ALJs challenged the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices' (HHS) program of performance appraisal of judges pursuant to the Bellmon
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, 456 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421
(1988)), alleging that the procedures under that program compromised their decisional
independence under the APA. Id. at 1133. In Heckler, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit found that many of the claims were well-founded, but held that the ALJs were not
entitled to relief in the absence of a specific showing that the program resulted in the
improper denial of benefits. Id. at 1143.
In Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. , 110 S.
Ct. 59 (1990), the Second Circuit held that the Secretary did not improperly impair
decisional independence under the APA. Nash, 869 F.2d at 680-81. Among the issues
in question were the Secretary's imposition on the Social Security Administration's
(SSA) ALJs of monthly production quotas and an attempt to control the number of
ALJ decisions reversing state-level determinations declining to award benefits. Id. at
678.
227. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law
Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 807, 807-08 nn.1-2 (1984). Conversations with
MSPB officials confirm that this has remained the case in the six years since publica-
tion of Timony's article.
228. In reviewing an ALJ's decision, the agency retains "all the necessary powers
which it would have in making the initial decision." Administrative Procedure Act, 5
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under which the AL's decision was based can be changed by the
agency through rulemaking, even in the middle of an appeal.2
In the 101st Congress, Senators Heflin, Pryor, and others sponsored
legislation that would establish a corps of ALJs which would be institu-
tionally separate from the agencies over whose adjudications they pre-
side.2' The corps concept, however, has not received universal support.
Some ALJs have opposed the concept as destructive of specialized ad-
ministrative expertise. Others, arguing that ALJs have suffered inroads
into their decisional independence, have called for an overhaul of their
agency alone.3 Still others have complained that the Heflin bill does
not pertain to those "cases heard by the hundreds of full-time presiding
officers or by the uncounted number of part-time hearing officers who
function under special statutory systems.... [T]he bill may be neglect-
ing the very people who are in greatest need of protection."3
Less comprehensive legislation also has been introduced. Senator
Pryor has proposed that all Social Security Administration (SSA) ad-
judicatory functions be placed under the operational control of a Chief
ALJ,' to be appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Health
U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988).
229. See Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132
(D.D.C. 1984) (challenging agencies' ability to conduct performance appraisals which
interfered with AL's independence). It is only when the agency accepts the ALJ's
decision, or if that decision is not appealed, that it becomes the final decision of the
agency. Id. at 1141. See also Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise 47 U. Ci. L. REv.
57, 61-62 (1980) (stating that "even if Congress chooses to call them judges ... [t]hey
are entirely subject to the agency on matters of law ...").
230. S. 594, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CoNG. Ric. 2711-13 (1989). See generally
Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 594 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (presenting range of opinions on pro-
posed creation of separate ALJ corps in Federal Government); Litt & Simeone, An
Administrative Law Judge Corps: Its Value and Relation to the Traditional Justice
System, 11 WMHTIER L. REv. 569 (1989) (favoring concept of independent federal
ALJ corps); Palmer & Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges as
an Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 673, 684 nn.68-70
(1984) (supporting creation of independent federal ALJ corps). But see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (suggesting that A.Js perform role "functionally com-
parable" to that of traditional judges).
231. Zankel, A Unified Corps of Federal Administrative Law Judges is Not
Needed, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 723, 743 (1984) (proposing creation of Health and
Human Services Review Commission to solve problems in Social Security
Administration).
232. Levinson, The Proposed Administrative Law Judge Corps: An Incomplete but
Important Reform Effort, 19 NEw ENG. L. REv. 733, 745-46 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
233. S. 1571, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S10,318-22 (1989).
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and Human Services.'" Cautious thinkers have advocated the estab-
lishment of an experimental mini-ALJ corps.2"6 The Federal Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 has, in effect,
mandated such a mini-corps,"" requiring the appropriate federal bank-
ing agencies and the National Credit Union Administration to establish
an ALJ pool.28 7 This legislation, however, had less to do with ALJ in-
dependence than with concern for efficiency and decisional quality.
III. QUESTIONS OF PROCESS
A. Bureaucratic Justice
The challenge of due process in the administrative state has been
central to the study of American administrative law. Goldberg v.
Kelly2" directly addressed this issue articulating a constitutional re-
quirement of "some kind of hearing" before a welfare "entitlement"
could be revoked. As Professor Schwartz correctly notes, Goldberg was
a turning point in the history of administrative procedure, and since
that decision, "the Goldberg entitlement approach to procedural due
process analyses has been applied to virtually all the cases that had
previously been held to involve only privileges.'"3 While courts have
debated what kind of hearing due process requires-pre- or post-termi-
nation, and with what procedural ingredients-the existence of a hear-
ing requirement remains a constitutional lodestar in modern adminis-
trative law.
"Between the idea and reality," T.S. Eliot teaches, "falls the
shadow."'' 2 0 In today's administrative state, the brute pressure of
caseload is the shadow hampering implementation of the "some kind of
hearing" principle. In mass entitlement programs, at least, hearings are
often rote; judges spend little time in making decisions. For one exam-
ple, the Social Security Appeals Council, which reviews disability
234. Id. § 712(A)(2), 135 CONG. REC. at S10,321. The Chief ALJ would report
directly to the Secretary. Id. § 712(5), 135 CONG. REC. at S10,322.
235. Unified Corps of ALJs, supra note 218, at 275-76 (proposing experimental
creation of such corps to serve most of small-volume agencies).
236. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 916, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (to be codified at scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). Cf ADJUDICATION PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE FEDERAL BANK
REGULATORY AGENCIES, ACUS RECOMMENDATION 87-12, 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-12
(1991).
237. Id. § 916.
238. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
239. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 554.




cases, spends, on average, no more than fifteen minutes on each case.', 1
It is unlikely that this short decisional framework will provide the "pro-
cess" that litigants consider "due."
Recent studies of mass entitlement programs have urged acceptance
of the notion of "bureaucratic justice," arguing that caseload pressures
make it necessary to reconceptualize the meaning of due process. Jerry
Mashaw's study of the SSA's disability adjudication program,' lays
out the tremendous problems faced in mass justice adjudication. The
paradigm of "bureaucratic rationality," he suggests, is a way to con-
ceive of an administrative law system that focuses on consistent, accu-
rate, and efficient implementation of agency policy. It represents an ef-
fort to secure, in a cost-effective way, information sufficient to make
accurate decisions while minimizing system error. This is a far less no-
ble enterprise than individualized advocacy in an adversary system con-
text." 8 Yet, it may in the end produce fairer results for more persons
involved in the mass justice system. Indeed, Judge Harold Leventhal
has observed that formal hearings are neither necessary, nor an essen-
tial feature of fair procedure. He invited attention as to whether, and to
what extent, procedural requirements developed for a formal adjudica-
tory model should be required in what he described as "low visibility
discretionary decisionmaking. '"I"' Adherents to such an approach would
rely more on expert agency testers, determiners, weighers, and ponder-
ers to make the best determination possible, and only then allow the
aggrieved person the right to challenge the legal, and perhaps to a lim-
ited extent, the factual basis for that determination in an adjudicative
procedure. Thus, they would have no quarrel with the employment of
doctors at Social Security district offices,"28 human rights specialists at
asylum centers,"" or fraud-spotters at alien legalization centers,"' as
241. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation
and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 199, 257 (1990).
242. J. MASHAw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
243. Mashaw calls this the paradigm of "moral judgment." He also develops a
third model, the paradigm of "professional treatment," in which decisionmaking au-
thority is surrendered to the essentially unreviewed judgment of service-oriented profes-
sionals-the standard doctor-patient relationship in America. Id. at 23-40.
244. Leventhal, Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, reprinted in C. CHRISTEN-
SEN & R. MIDDLEKAUF, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
293, 298 (1977) (stating "decisions in adjudicatory model hearings are not necessarily
applicable for other models of agency [decisionmaking]").
245. See IMPROVED USE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
DETERMINATIONS, ACUS RECOMMENDATION 89-10, 1 C.F.R. § 305.89-10 (1991) (stat-
ing medical personnel could offer valuable assistance in making disability
determinations).
246. See ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES, ACUS RECOMMENDATION 89-4, 1
19911
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long as their determinations were subject to challenge in a tribunal,
either an agency or court, for legal, or to a limited extent factual, infir-
mities only. This question as to whether the adjudication model of deci-
sionmaking is preferable to reliance on technical experts remains a con-
tinuing concern in administrative law.
B. Informal Procedures and Complementary Adjudicatory
Processes
Professor Schwartz suggests that the administrative process will be-
come increasingly formalistic over time. 4" It is both questionable
whether his predicted "judicialization" of the administrative process is
correct, and whether such a trend is necessarily a positive development.
While there is no doubt that the adversary system encourages formali-
zation, there is a growing trend in administrative law toward more in-
formal procedures.
The administrative process, it must be remembered, was intended as
a less formal alternative to the judicial resolution of disputes. The early
history of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) shows that the
nineteenth century ICC often resolved complaints simply by writing in-
formal letters to the railroads asking them to justify particular rates or
practices. 4' One hundred years ago, then, the ICC was using an early
form of alternative dispute resolution.
The effort to replace formal hearings with less costly, less time-con-
suming alternatives has developed slowly. In the early 1970's, the Su-
preme Court held that formal APA hearing requirements need apply
only if the agency's enabling statute, in addition to providing for a
hearing, also expressly prescribes that such a hearing be "on the rec-
C.F.R. § 305.89-4 (1991).
247. See MASS DECISION-MAKING PROGRAMS: THE ALIEN LEGALIZATION ExPERI-
ENCE, ACUS STATEMENT No. 14, 1 C.F.R. § 310.14 (1991).
248. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 569-70.
249. See A. JONES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF THOMAS MCINTYRE
COOLEY: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 312 (1987) (stating that, "[w]hile the
Commission adopted simple and efficient rules of practice, ... it did not overemphasize
its judicial character. It sought to settle most complaints by agreement among parties..
• ."); H. NEWCOMB, THE WORK OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 18 (re-
print ed. 1981) (noting that many complaints to Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) during 1898-1900 were settled by "informal action"); Auerbach, The Expansion
of ICC Administrative Law Activities, 16 TRANSP. REV. 92, 94 (1987) (commenting
"[bly 1901, the great majority of complaints before the ICC were disposed of by con-
ferences with shippers and carriers or by correspondence. The concept of paper pro-
ceedings as an administrative substitute for even the informal hearing had become a
reality in less than a decade").
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ord."' 60 Following this view, the District of Columbia Circuit endorsed
a system of "paper hearings" established by the FCC for comparative
licensing cases involving cellular radio communication. 251 Likewise, the
Seventh Circuit approved the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
(NRC) conclusion that formal hearings are not required for amend-
ments to source material licenses. 62 Recently, the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld EPA regulations implementing the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984 that provide for the use of non-APA pro-
cedures, including reliance on EPA regional lawyers instead of admin-
istrative law judges as initial decisionmakers, in cases involving interim
corrective measures.2 58 On a few occasions in environmental statutes,
Congress has expressly provided for agency imposition of civil penalties
without formal APA procedures.'"
A wide range of procedural techniques to complement conventional
administrative or court litigation has developed under the rubric of al-
ternative dispute resolution (ADR). Indeed, some use of ADR has al-
ready been institutionalized in selected federal district courts.'56 Addi-
250. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (noting ICC's
establishment of per diem rates for freight car use did not trigger formal rulemaking
under APA since record provided substantial basis on which reasonable rules were
promulgated); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972)
(holding ICC's "car-service rules" were reasonable in light of substantial record sup-
port of national freight car shortage which could be alleviated by mandatory obser-
vance of rules).
251. See Cellular Mobile Sys. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting sur-
rebuttal and cross-examination are authorized only when AU finds that this type of
testimony is needed to complete record); Cellular Mobile Sys. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 182
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating APA expressly authorizes "paper hearings" in licensing cases
when party will not be prejudiced by that proceeding).
252. West Chicago v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983).
See also Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 927 (1983) (noting trial-type hearings are not required for denial of dredge and
fill permits under Clean Water Act).
253. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
In Chemical Waste Management, plaintiffs sought review of regulations promulgated
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, arguing that the infor-
mal procedures established by the regulations violated due process. The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit ruled that the Act did not require the EPA to hold formal hearings and
that the informal hearing process which the agency initiated did not violate plaintiff's
due process rights. Id. at 1485.
254. Water Quality Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2) (1988) (capping civil
penalties at $25,000 for each day of violation); Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments
of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(1)(B) (1988) (authorizing administrative imposition of
civil penalties of up to $125,000).
255. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Title IX Pub. L. No.
100-702, § 901, 102 Stat. 4642, 4650 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988)) (au-
thorizing voluntary and mandatory arbitration in selected cases in federal district
courts).
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tionally, in recent years, a number of federal agencies have begun to
employ one or another ADR methodology. Agencies such as the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),"8 ' the EPA,"7
the Army Corps of Engineers,'" the Department of Energy,' s" and the
Department of the Navy26" have used mini-trials to resolve complex
contract claims. The Department of Justice has issued guidelines on the
use of mini-trials for resolving commercial disputes,2'1 as has the
United States Claims Court.'
A few agency Boards of Contract Appeals have begun to adopt poli-
cies favoring use of ADR techniques such as settlement judges, non-
presiding judges who serve as neutral evaluators. One example is the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission which has used settlement
judges to settle cases otherwise destined for trial."" The Merit Systems
Protection Board created a voluntary expedited appeal process and en-
couraged mediation of employee grievances. 2" In addition, a number of
agencies have utilized a form of ADR known as negotiated rulemaking.
The recent passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
(Act)," 81 signified legislative support for agency use of ADR. The new
256. Johnson, Masri & Oliver, Minitrial Successfully Resolves NASA-TRW Dis-
pute, Legal Times, Sept. 6, 1982, at 13, col. 1.
257. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON THE
USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EPA ENFORCEMENT CASES (1987)
(hereinafter EPA GUIDANCE], reprinted in ACUS SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY
USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 737 (Office of the Chairman,
1987) (hereinafter ACUS SOURCEBOOK].
258. See UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, THE MINI-TRIAL (1989)
(describing Corps' experiences with various minitrials).
259. Crowell & Pou, Appealing Government Contract Decisions: Reducing the
Cost and Delay of Procurement Litigation with Alternative Dispute Resolution Tech-
niques, 49 MD. L. REV. 183, 206-07 (1990).
260. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTES RESO-
LUTION PROGRAM, MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY AND PROCEDURES (Dec.
1986), reprinted in ACUS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 257, at 847.
261. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIv., COMMERCIAL LITIG.
BRANCH, MEMORANDUM ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION-MINI-TRIALS
(1986), reprinted in ACUS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 257, at 827.
262. United States Claims Court, General Order No. 13: Notice to Counsel on
Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques (Apr. 15, 1987), reprinted in ACUS
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 257, at 731.
263. For a description of this Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism,
see AGENCY USE OF SETTLEMENT JUDGES, RECOMMENDATION 88-5, I C.F.R. § 305.88-
5 (1991). See Joseph & Gilbert, Breaking the Settlement Ice: The Use of Settlement
Judges in Administrative Proceedings, 1988 ACUS 281 (providing background report
for recommendation).
264. See Adams & Figueroa, Expediting Settlement of Employee Grievances in
the Federal Sector: An Evaluation of the MSPBs Appeals Arbitration Procedure,
1985 ACUS 1, 15 (detailing ADR measures used at Merit Systems Protection Board).
265. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 9 U.S.C. and 5 U.S.C., and 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-593 (1988)). For a general dis-
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law amends section 556 of the APA to encourage the use of ADR by
agencies.m It specifically authorizes use of consensual arbitration by
government agencies in specified circumstances. The most controversial
provision of the ADR legislation proved to be its consensual arbitration
provision.2 7 During hearings regarding the legislation, the Department
of Justice raised constitutional concerns about agency use of arbitra-
tion, suggesting that binding arbitration constitutes an impermissible
delegation of policymaking authority from government officials to pri-
vate sector decisionmakers, in violation of article II.2" Given its con-
cern over the protection of executive prerogatives, the Department of
Justice's position is understandable. Nonetheless, although the clauses
from the Constitution and even some of the cases cited by the govern-
ment can be construed broadly to require that all government deci-
sional activity remain in the hands of federal employees, they need not
be read so sweepingly. Rather, only critical decisions must be made by
cussion of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, see Breger, Amendments to Pro-
cedure Act Encourage Agencies to Use ADR, Nat'l L.J., March 4, 1991, at 22.
266. The statute also requires each agency to promote alternative methods of dis-
pute resolution by: (a) designating a senior official to be the agency's "Dispute Resolu-
tion Specialist," id. I 3(b), 104 Sat. 2737; (b) providing training for agency personnel,
id. § 3(c), 104 Stat. 2737; (c) reviewing agency contracts, grants and other administra-
tive programs to ensure that ADR is authorized and promoted, id. § 3(d), 104 Stat.
2737; and (d) adopting a policy addressing potential use of ADR, id. § 3(a), 104 Stat.
2737.
While ADR has been spreading in administrative agencies, it also has its critics. See
generally, Guill & Slavin, Rush to Unfairness: The Downside of ADR, 28 THE JUDGES
J. 8 (1989) (addressing problems of using ADR). Cf Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1986) (explaining possible
hazards presented by use of ADR); Edwards, Hopes and Fears for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 425 (1985) (focusing on practical problems of
ADR, and concluding with cautious endorsement of new ADR legislation). Prior to the
enactment of the new ADR legislation, the Comptroller General had ruled that absent
explicit congressional authorization, a federal agency may not use binding arbitration
which determines monetary liability for the United States. 16 COMP. GEN. 282, 283
(Sept. 21, 1936); 20 Comp. GEN. 640, 641 (Apr. 15, 1941); 32 COMP. GEN. 333 (Jan.
27, 1953). But see Berg, Legal and Structural Obstacles to the Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution for Claims for and Against the Federal Government, in ADNUNIS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, AGENCY
ARBITRATION 43-73 (1988) (addressing concerns of Comptroller General).
267. Under the Act, voluntary arbitration is authorized when all parties agree to its
use, subject to a provision that permits an agency a brief period of time in which to
review the appropriateness of an arbitral award before the award becomes final. Pub.
L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2736 (amending Chapter 5 of Title 5 of U.S.C. §
590(c) (1988)). See Breger, Realizing the Potential of Arbitration in Federal Agency
Dispute Resolution, ARBITRATION J. 35-37 (June 1991) (addressing potential of
ADR).
268. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing Before Subcomm.
on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 86, 93-102 (1989) (prepared statement of William P. Barr,
Asst. Att'y General, Office of Legal Counsel).
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government agencies. The critical decision for arbitration is whether or
not to have the dispute arbitrated in the first place. Since the Act puts
this initial decision firmly in the hands of officers of the United States,
control over the arbitration process is properly vested in the executive
branch.'1 Indeed, since the executive branch has the right to settle
rather than litigate a case, it would seem that it ought to have what
appears to be the lesser, included right to agree to a procedure for
resolving a case. In fact, a variety of federal statutes already provide
specifically for agreements for resolving disputes with the government,
including those implicating future government financial liability, by use
of private arbitrators.'
7 0
Another argument against the use of arbitration in disputes involving
the Federal Government is that arbitration contravenes article III by
transferring judicial power to private hands. However, there is nothing
magical about using the courts to decide disputes. Administrative agen-
cies, after all, now routinely decide a wide range of cases that were, at
one time or another, the province of the courts. 7 1 In 1985 the Supreme
Court expressly upheld in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co.,7'' a requirement of binding arbitration for certain dis-
putes under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA).' 7 ' Under FIFRA, the arbitrator's decision is subject to judi-
cial review only on the issues of fraud, misrepresentation, or miscon-
duct-a standard of review somewhat similar to that contained in the
Federal Arbitration Act.' 7 ' In rejecting the article III concerns, Justice
O'Connor observed that "[tjo hold otherwise would be to erect a rigid
and formalistic restraint on the ability of Congress to adopt innovative
measures such as negotiation and arbitration with respect to rights cre-
269. See Bruff, The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 1987
ACUS 533 (finding no constitutional problem with arbitration).
270. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2398 (1988) (investment guaranties under foreign assis-
tance programs); 46 U.S.C. § 749 (1988) (suits in Admiralty Act); 46 U.S.C. § 786
(1988) (arbitration, compromise or settlement under Public Vessels Act); 5 U.S.C. §
I 101(c)(5) (1988) (binding arbitration of employee grievances under collective bargain-
ing agreements pursuant to Civil Service Reform Act).
271. See Pierce, Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers and the Structure of
Government, 1988 Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 15.
272. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
273. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -13 6 y (1988).
274. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 601 (1985). In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted that
judicial review under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
"encompasses authority of courts to invalidate arbitrator's decision when that decision
exceeds arbitrator's authority or exhibits manifest disregard for governing law."
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 601.
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ated by a regulatory scheme. '3 78
Given the position of the Department of Justice, the recently-enacted
ADR legislation appeared stalled in the legislative process. To move
the legislation forward, a compromise was fashioned by providing a
thirty-day waiting period before an arbitral award becomes final,176
and authorizing an agency head to vacate any award within this wait-
ing period. Should such an award be vacated, the United States may be
liable for attorneys fees.27 7 The government underscored that it ex-
pected that this "opt-out" provision rarely would be used.278 Should
this indeed be the case, arbitration may yet become a valuable ADR
device for government agencies.
Despite Professor Schwartz' suggestion that the administrative pro-
cess will become increasingly formalistic over time, 7 it is important to
remember that formality can also raise problems that may be as serious
as those which it is designed to ensure against. Formality typically
raises the cost of participation in the administrative process and formal
procedures are frequently time-consuming. Even simple requirements
such as duplicating and filing multiple copies of written documents, us-
ing expedited mail service, or paying for a transcript, will raise the
participation costs-in some cases, beyond the reach of some individu-
als or groups.
275. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 594. Although not discussed in the opinion, the constitu-
tional propriety of using private arbitrators in the judicial branch was fully briefed by
the parties.
Yet an additional claim by critics is that arbitration can violate the requirements of
due process. There is no reason to believe that arbitration cannot be conducted in full
compliance with due process standards. Indeed, in Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188
(1982), the Supreme Court upheld the use of private decisionmakers for part of the
Medicare program against an express due process challenge. Apart from the potential
due process problems presented in the case, the Court showed no concern over the
conferral of governmental authority on private parties-even though that was one of
the bases on which the lower court struck down the scheme. McClure v. Harris, 503 F.
Supp. 409, 414, 415-17 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Schweiker v. McClure, 456
U.S. 188 (1982).
276. Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2736, 2743 (amending Chapter 5 of
Title 5 of U.S.C. S 590(b) (1988)).
277. Pub. L. No. 101-552 § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2736, 2744 (amending Chapter 5 of
Title 5 of U.S.C. § 590(g) (1988)).
278. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 47-48 (1990) (noting testimony of Asst. Att'y Gen. Wil-
liam P. Barr, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice); Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 86,
93-102 (1989) (giving prepared statement of Asst. Att'y Gen. William P. Barr, Office
of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
279. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 569-70.
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The British administrative law tradition, in contrast, emphasizes in-
formality.' 80 Lay judges constitute the majority of the many tribunals
which resolve administrative disputes. 81 The procedures followed are
relatively informal, and the assistance of a lawyer is often unneces-
sary.' 8 Review of tribunal decisions is available but is limited to ques-
tions of law, not fact, except in one respect-if "natural justice" has
been violated, to quote the quaint British phrase for what we call "due
process of law." It is wrong to assume, moreover, that formal proce-
dures are always better procedures.
CONCLUSION
The new century will require considerable revision in our under-
standing of the administrative process. The explosive growth in
rulemaking will challenge us to maintain notions of democratic ac-
countability in an increasingly bureaucratic political order. This will
require close attention to issues of separation of powers and coordina-
tion of agency activity by those who are politically accountable.
The caseload pressures of administrative adjudications will require
careful assessment of the role of the administrative judiciary. Do we
want administrative hearings to be junior courts, as they are tending
towards today, or a different kind of adjudication process that main-
tains fairness without procedural barnacles? Similarly, is the case for
administrative bureaucracy based on expertise as has traditionally been
asserted? Or is it based on bureaucratic necessity-a bureaucratization
de monde-which will inevitably affect all industrialized nations?
The need for rethinking is clear. This is especially true with respect
to the constant tensions between formality and informality and between
the branches of government that pervade administrative law. The hear-
ing and rulemaking provisions of the APA-its very core-have been
amended only slightly in the last forty-five years. The last thorough
congressional review of the administrative process took place in the
1970's and failed to yield legislation. 8 3 The last thorough executive
branch review, the Ash Council, was a Carter Administration achieve-
ment.'" Theoretical work in the field, while especially rich, has only
280. See generally B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1972).
281. Administrative Justice: Some Necessary Reforms, REVIEW OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 212 (1988).
282. Id. at 211-12, 225-51.
283. STAFF OF SENATE Comm. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D.
SEss., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS (Comm. Print 1978).
284. THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A
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begun to consider the larger administrative law terrain.21" When Max
Weber began to describe the bureaucratic model, he had in mind a
process that affected society as well as the state.2 6 Ours must attempt
to do so. It is in the tension between bureaucracy, democracy, and effi-
ciency that the administrative law of the twenty-first century is to be
found.
NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED REGULATORY AGENCIES
(1971).
285. See C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY (1990) (presenting radical departure from conventional views of role of
judiciary in administrative state); C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990) (suggesting new focus on administra-
tive substance rather than judicial review to effectuate solutions to regulatory problem);
J. MAHw & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990) (detailing one
regulatory agency's shift from performance standards to individualized enforcement
actions).
286. M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956-1005 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds.
1978).
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